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ANEW INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTSCOURT FORWEST
AFRICA: THE ECOWASCOMMUNITYCOURTOF JUSTICE
By Karen J. Alter,* Laurence R. Helfer,† and Jacqueline R. McAllister‡
The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWASCourt) is an increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights. Since acquir-
ing jurisdiction over human rights complaints in 2005, the ECOWASCourt has issued numer-
ous decisions condemning human rights violations by the member states of the Economic
Community of West African States (Community).1 Among this Court’s path-breaking cases2
are judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for
impeding the right to free basic education for all children.3The ECOWASCourt also has broad
access and standing rules that permit individuals andnongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the Court. Although theCourt is generally
careful in the proof that it requires of complainants and in the remedies that it demands of gov-
ernments, it has not shied away from politically courageous decisions, such as rulings against
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1 Fifteen nations are currentlymembers of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso,CapeVerde,Coˆte d’Ivoire, theGam-
bia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
2 A list of all judgments and rulings of the ECOWAS Court, as well as copies of selected decisions, are available
on the Court’s website. ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, List of Decided Cases from 2004 Till Date, at
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option!com_content&view!article&id!157&Itemid!27.
The first five years of judgments and rulings have been published in an official reporter, but it is not widely avail-
able. 2004–2009 COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT (2011). Selected decisions, some
in unofficial translation, are available on other online databases. E.g., Centre for Human Rights, University of Pre-
toria, African Human Rights Case Law Database, at http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-institution/
ecowas-ccj.html; WorldCourts, ECOWAS Community Court of Justice: Decisions, at http://www.worldcourts.com/
ecowasccj/eng/.
3 E.g., Lydia Polgreen, Court Rules Niger Failed by Allowing Girl’s Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008,
at A6; ECOWASCourt Orders Gambia to PayMusa Saidykhan $200,000 in Landmark Case, JOLLOFNEWS (Dec. 16,
2010), at http://www.jollofnews.com/human-rights/1629-ecowas-court-orders-gambia-to-pay-musa-saidykhan-
200000-?in-landmark-case-; AfricanChild InformationHub,WestAfrica: ECOWASCourtOrdersNigeria to Provide
Free Education for Every Child (Dec. 2, 2010), at http://www.africanchildinfo.net/index.php?option!com_
k2&view!item&id!5046%3Awest-africa-ecowas-court-orders-nigeria-to-provide-free-education-for-every-
child&Itemid!67&lang!en#; Amnesty International, Nigeria: Ground-Breaking Judgment Calls for Punishing
Oil Companies over Pollution (Dec. 17, 2012), at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-ground-breaking-
judgment-calls-punishing-oil-companies-over-pollution-2012-12-17.
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the Gambia for the torture of journalists and against Nigeria for failing to regulate multina-
tional companies that have degraded the environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta.
Our primary goal in this article is to explain how an international tribunal, initially estab-
lished to help build a commonmarket, was redeployed as a human rights court. In particular,
we ask why West African governments, which set up the ECOWAS Court in a way that has
allowed persistent flouting of Community economic rules, later delegated to ECOWAS judges
remarkably far-reaching human rights jurisdiction.
TheECOWASCourt’s transformation is surprising inmanyways.By all accounts, ECOWAS
hasmade little progress toward its professed goal of regional economic integration.Trade flows
among West African nations remain extremely low; tariffs, customs regulations, nontariff
barriers, and roadblocks hinder cross-border economic transactions;4 and member states have
yet to challenge barriers to intraregional trade before the ECOWAS Court. If our story ended
here,with anew international court struggling for relevance, fewwouldbe surprised.However,
our story takes a sharp and unexpected turn in 2005 with an expansion of the Court’s juris-
diction to include human rights complaints by private litigants.
Whenwe began our study, we had low expectations for the ECOWASCourt. Human rights
violations, destabilizing coups, and civil unrest are sadly commonplace in West Africa, and
domestic legal institutions are generally weak.5 We anticipated that national governments in
such a region would resist giving an international court the power to review human rights
claims fromprivate litigants. And if officials did give the court such authority, we expected that
they would put in place political checks to carefully control the judges and their decisions.
What we found—based on a review of ECOWAS Court decisions and more than two dozen
interviews with judges, Community officers, government officials, attorneys, and NGOs6—
was quite different. The member states gave the ECOWAS Court a broad human rights juris-
diction, and they have eschewed opportunities to narrow the Court’s authority.
The ECOWAS Court’s repurposing and subsequent survival as an international human
rights court have several unexpected dimensions. First, the Court did not claim human rights
competence for itself via judicial lawmaking. Rather, it acquired this authority in response to
a coordinated campaign in which bar associations, NGOs, and ECOWAS officials—in addi-
tion to ECOWASCourt judges themselves—mobilized to securemember states’ consent to the
transformation. Second, the Court has strikingly capacious jurisdiction and access rules, with
no specified catalogue of human rights, with direct access for private litigants, and with no
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.These design features are especially curious because
West African states have been reluctant to grant similar authority to the judicial institutions
4 S. K. B. Asante, Economic Community of West African States, inTHEOXFORDCOMPANION TO POLITICS OF
THE WORLD 233, 234 ( Joe¨l Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001).
5 See, e.g., Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Investing in Peace and Security in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS, in SECURITY
AND DEVELOPMENT: INVESTING IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY 337, 351 (Robert Picciotto & Rachel Weaving
eds., 2006); Eghosa E. Osaghae, Human Rights and Transition Societies in West Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
SOCIETIES INTRANSITION:CAUSES,CONSEQUENCES,RESPONSES 315, 315 (Shale AsherHorowitz&Albrecht
Schnabel eds., 2004); ISSAKA K. SOUARE´, CIVIL WARS AND COUPS D’E´TAT IN WEST AFRICA: AN ATTEMPT
TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS AND PRESCRIBE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 135 (2006).
6 Topreserve anonymity in accordancewith the approval granted by our universities’ institutional reviewboards,
unless expressly requested by our sources, the names of our interviewees have been redacted. Each interview is iden-
tified here by date, location, and category, and by a unique identifying letter that is used in our records of all inter-
views.
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of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights7 (African Charter).Third, when the
ECOWAS Court’s early rulings generated opposition from some governments, the member
states eschewed opportunities to rein in the Court. Instead, they adopted institutional reforms
that arguably strengthen the judges’ independence andauthority.Nevertheless, theCourt faces
an ongoing challenge of securing compliance with its judgments, a challenge that the judges
are attempting to meet by tailoring the remedies that they award to successful applicants and
by publicly pressuring governments to implement the Court’s rulings.
Our study of the ECOWAS Court’s transformation has two broader theoretical implica-
tions.8 The first relates to how international institutions, including courts, evolve over time.
Rationalist theories of cooperation generally conceive of international institutions as problem-
solvingdevices to further states’ functional goals.Wecontrast rationalist approaches that tether
institutions to the states that created them to historical institutionalist accounts that expect
institutions to evolve in response to political contestation and societal pressures. States nev-
ertheless play an important part in our narrative, particularly through their decisions in the
1990s to authorize humanitarian intervention inWest Africa and expand ECOWAS’s regional
security role.We argue that these decisions triggered a cascade of smaller reforms in the Com-
munity that, in the mid-2000s, created an opening for an alliance of civil society groups and
supranational actors to mobilize in favor of court reform.
A second theoretical implication relates to the repurposing of international courts. The
ECOWASCourt’s shift into human rights is not unique. The EuropeanCourt of Justice (ECJ)
made an equivalent shift in the 1970s.More recently, courts associated with other subregional
economic communities—most notably, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community (SADCTribunal)—have made
similar moves. In all three instances, however, the judges themselves asserted the authority to
adjudicate human rights claims. In Africa, the political and legal consequences of these bold
assertions of competence are still unfolding, but early evidence indicates that the EACJ and the
SADC Tribunal have faced greater opposition from governments than has the ECOWAS
Court.9 We argue that the manner by which an international court acquires a human rights
jurisdiction matters, for reasons we will elaborate.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the founding of ECOWAS
and the ECOWASCourt, and the expansion of the Community’s role in regional security.We
explain thatmember states added a tribunal toECOWASas part of awider re-launchof regional
integration in the early 1990s. Yet they also rejected a proposal to give private litigants access
to the Court to facilitate enforcement of regional economic rules. As a result, the Court sat
unused for several years.
7 African (Banjul) Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520UNTS 217, 21 ILM58 (1982)
[hereinafter African Charter].
8 This theoretical account builds on our prior work. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THENEWTERRAINOF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (forthcoming 2014); Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer,Nature
or Nurture? Judicial Law-Making in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT’LORG.
563 (2010); Laurence R.Helfer&Anne-Marie Slaughter,Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
9 E.g., SolomonTamarabrakemi Ebobrah, LitigatingHuman Rights Before Sub-regional Courts in Africa, 17 AFR.
J. INT’L&COMP. L. 79 (2009); James Gathii,The Under-appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade Judi-
ciaries, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 245 (2010); Lucyline NkathaMurungi & Jacqui Gallinetti, The Role of Sub-regional
Courts in the African Human Rights System, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 119 (2010).
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Part II begins by summarizing the dismissal of the ECOWAS Court’s first case—a suit by a
private trader challenging a border closure. The case served as the catalyst for a campaign by
bar associations, NGOs, Community officials, and ECOWAS judges, which resulted in the
2005 Protocol that gives the Court broad human rights jurisdiction.10 After summarizing the
rationales and mobilization campaign behind the 2005 Protocol, we analyze three distinctive
features of the restructured Court’s design—direct access for private parties, the absence of
ECOWAS-specific human rights standards, and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
In part III we evaluate the ECOWAS Court’s track record as a human rights tribunal. We
focus on threemajor challenges to theCourt’s authority—acontroversial electiondecision that
engendered criticism from the public and legal elites in Nigeria; a proposal by the Gambia to
narrow theCourt’s jurisdiction in response to rulings declaring the government responsible for
torture; and concerns relating to noncompliance with ECOWAS Court rulings. We explain
how theCourt hasweathered these challenges bymobilizing supportive constituencies, adjust-
ing the remedies it orders, and publicly cajoling governments to implement its decisions.
Part IV considers the theoretical implications of our analysis, contrasting rationalist inter-
national relations and historical institutionalist theories of institutional change. We explain
how the strategy that advocates adopted—conflating the economic goals of ECOWASwith its
human rights objectives—contributed to the ironic result that an international court estab-
lished to promote regional integration now adjudicates cases involving high-profile human
rights violations while remaining largely unavailable to traders and other economic actors in
the region.
InpartV,we concludeby assessing the implications of theECOWASCourt’s transformation
for the survival prospects of Africa’s other subregional courts and for broader debates about
fragmentation and the coherent interpretation of international human rights law.
I. THE POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ECOWAS
AND ITS COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE
This part discusses the motives for establishing an economic integration regime in West
Africa andwhy the commitment of ECOWASmember states to this regime has remained shal-
low.We then explain how, in the 1990s, theCommunity became involved in regional security
and good governance issues, which later created a political opening to transform the ECOWAS
Court.We conclude by linking the creation of theCourt to these developments and explaining
the member states’ rejection of a proposal to grant private litigants direct access to the Court.
The Founding of ECOWAS and the Barriers to Economic Integration inWest Africa
Why were West African governments interested in economic integration? At the founding
of ECOWAS in 1975, the Community’s primary goals, as defined by the Treaty, were to pro-
mote cooperation and development in a wide array of issue areas, including commerce, agri-
culture, natural resources,monetary and financial policy, security, and social and culturalmat-
10 Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 of Protocol
(A/P.1/7/91) Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English Version of the
Said Protocol, Jan. 19, 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Protocol], at http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/
supplementary_protocol.pdf.
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ters.11 The project included removing intraregional trade barriers, reflecting the conventional
view that openmarkets attract foreign investment and encourage development.Member states
understood from the project’s inception, however, that integration of national markets would
be only one of many ECOWAS objectives.12
The names given to ECOWAS institutionsmimicked their European Community counter-
parts. In reality, however, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty created a system of policymaking bodies
that governments tightly controlled. The principal Community institutions included an
Authority of Heads of State and Government (Authority), the highest ECOWAS decision-
making body; a Council of Ministers, which served in an advisory capacity to the Authority;
and an Executive Secretariat responsible for the day-to-day administration of ECOWAS pol-
icies. These bodies adopted initiatives that, on paper, committed governments to phase out
quantitative and other restrictions on intraregional trade, create a customs union, establish a
common commercial policy, and permit the free movement of goods and persons.13
In reality, the legal framework required to carry out these policies was lacking. The insti-
tutions created by the 1975 Treaty, unlike those of the European Community, “left national
sovereignty intact.”14 The decisions of the Authority and the Council of Ministers were bind-
ing only on ECOWAS institutions. They had no legal force for member states, which had
merely agreed to “make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating
favourable conditions for the achievement of” the Community’s aims.15 In the absence of del-
egated supranational decision-making powers, ECOWAS policies were formulated using a
standard tool of public international law—a series of protocols adopted unanimously that
accorded eachgovernmentdiscretionwith respect to ratification and implementation, and that
entered into force only after a majority of countries had ratified. This cumbersome and polit-
icized decision-making process was a “slow and inadequate” mechanism for Community law-
making.16
At a deeper level, there was also good reason to question the economic and political logic of
a West African integration project. ECOWAS countries are geographically proximate, and
instability in one nation can easily destabilize neighboring countries. But in other respects, the
divisions among themember states were and remain profound. Regional infrastructure is woe-
fully underdeveloped, which makes intraregional trade costly.17 Francophone countries are
deeply linked toFrance’s economic andpolitical system,whereasNigeria andGhana—the two
11 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 1010 UNTS 17, 14 ILM 1200.
12 The economic theorymotivating the creationof ECOWAS is discussed inKOFIOTENGKUFUOR,THE INSTI-
TUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 2–8 (2006).
13 Charles D. Jebuni, The Role of ECOWAS in Trade Liberalization, in TRADE REFORM AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 489, 493 (Zubair Iqbal & Mohsin S. Khan eds., 1998).
14 Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty, Final Report 16 ( June 1992)
[hereinafter Final CEP Report] (on file with authors).
15 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, supra note 11, Art. 3.
16 S. K. B. ASANTE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA: A DECADE OF THE ECO-
NOMICCOMMUNITYOF WESTAFRICANSTATES (ECOWAS) 70 (1986); see alsoMUHAMMEDTAWFIQLADAN,
INTRODUCTION TO ECOWAS COMMUNITY LAW AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION, MIGRATION, HUMAN
RIGHTS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, PEACE AND SECURITY 7 (2009) (explaining that “most often, Community texts
adopted in the so-called areas of sovereignty were in the form of protocols, and there was considerable delay in their
application owing to the slow pace of protocol ratification”).
17 Chukwuma Agu,Obstacles to Regional Integration: The Human Factor Challenge to Trade Facilitation and Port
Reforms in Nigeria, 2 INT’L J. PRIVATE L. 445 (2009).
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largest Anglophone economies—have different capabilities and economic goals.18 The key
tradingpartners forWestAfrican countries are outside of the region, and the little intraregional
trade that occurs involves natural resources, agricultural products, and low-value-added con-
sumption products such as rubber, plastics, and cosmetics.19 Although some traders stand to
benefit from easier access to regionalmarkets,many local producers actively seek to avoid com-
petition from firms in other ECOWAS countries.20
Building a commonmarket inWest Africa was nonetheless attractive for a different reason.
The 1975 ECOWASTreaty signaled to its poorer neighbors that Nigeria—the “big brother”21
of West Africa, which then accounted for nearly 70 percent of the region’s total GDP22—fa-
vored regional cooperation. ECOWAShelpedNigeria to consolidate its status as regional hege-
mon by indicating to neighboring countries that they would benefit fromNigeria’s oil wealth
and from access to its large and lucrativemarket.23 For example, theCommunity’s goal of pro-
moting the free movement of workers could enable desperately poor West Africans to move
to a country where jobs and resources were more plentiful.24 Nigeria’s financial backing was
also important. In 1975, import and export taxes ranged from 15 to 50 percent of national
revenues.25 Governments envisioned that ECOWAS would replace these tax proceeds with a
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. All member states were required to
contribute to the fund, but in proportion to each country’s gross domestic product and per
capita income. Nigerian largesse thus provided the bulk of the Community revenue to replace
domestic trade taxes.26 It also provided extra funds to support the activities of Community
institutions.27
Notwithstanding this planned reduction in trade taxes, ECOWAS did not endorse a free
market philosophy. To the contrary, its policies reflected the thenwidely held view that indus-
trialized countries preyed on the economic weaknesses of the developing world. The remedy
for this dependency, according to this view, was to build local industrial capacity and an export
18 E.g., ASANTE, supra note 16, at 48; Julius EmekaOkolo,TheDevelopment and Structure of ECOWAS, inWEST
AFRICANREGIONALCOOPERATION ANDDEVELOPMENT 19, 42 ( Julius EmekaOkolo& StephenWright eds.,
1990).
19 Mary E. Burfisher&Margaret B.Missiaen, Intraregional Trade inWest Africa, inWESTAFRICANREGIONAL
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 185–213; Phoebe Kornfeld, ECOWAS, The First Decade:
Towards Collective Self-Reliance, orMaintenance of the Status Quo?, inWESTAFRICANREGIONALCOOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 87, 91 (noting that intraregional trade averaged between 2.8 percent and
4.1 percent of the member states’ total trade volume during the first ten years of ECOWAS). These trade volumes
have remained stable since the 1970s. IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI, POLITICAL AND COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF ECOWAS 40–41 (1991).
20 E.g., Agu, supra note 17, at 455; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, Sub-state Protectionism in Ghana, 18 AFR. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 78, 80–81 (2010).
21 E.g., OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, AFRICA IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
PAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 42 (2009) (explaining that “Nigeria has become the big brother (Super power) of
West Africa”).
22 Okolo, supra note 18, at 42.
23 GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 18; KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 22; Olatunde Ojo, Nigeria and the Formation of
ECOWAS, 34 INT’L ORG. 571, 584 (1980).
24 Julius EmekaOkolo,FreeMovement of Persons in ECOWAS andNigeria’s Expulsion of Illegal Aliens, 40WORLD
TODAY 428, 431 (1984).
25 GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 42; Okolo, supra note 18, at 49 n.43.
26 Okolo, supra note 18, at 32 (explaining that Nigeria provided nearly one-third of the contributions to the
Community fund).
27 GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 58.
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sector to replace reliance on foreign imports.28 Nigeria, in particular, favored a region-wide
effort to build indigenous industries.29 The Francophone countries, however, were heavily
dependent on investment from France, and foreign investors were primarily interested in
gaining access to regional markets. Voting as a bloc, the Francophone members of ECOWAS
prevented the adoption of Community rules of origin. Anglophone members reacted, in
turn, by opposing free-trade rules that would have given French producers open access to
theirmarkets.30 The net result of these intraregional tensions was a stalemate within ECOWAS
and rampant noncompliance with Community rules.31 Not surprisingly, assessments of
the on-the-ground impact of the first phase of West African integration were overwhelmingly
negative.32
The Rise of Regional Security, Good Governance, and Human Rights in ECOWAS
The 1980s was a period of economic turmoil and political conflict in West Africa. Early in
the decade, the collapse of world oil prices and themismanagement of oil revenues ledNigeria
to focus on domestic priorities and deemphasize its commitment to ECOWAS.33 A further
low point followed in 1983 whenNigeria expelled hundreds of thousands of “illegal” workers
from other member states. Mass expulsions had occurred before inWest Africa. But the 1975
ECOWAS Treaty and its free-movement protocols professed a commitment to a different and
more open migration policy.34 Nigeria’s expulsions increased employment opportunities for
domestic workers and thus were politically popular at home. But they were widely viewed as
flouting the spirit, if not the letter, of ECOWAS free-movement rules.35
The end of the ColdWar had a significant impact on the Community.West African coun-
tries began to liberalize their economies as a condition of receiving loans from theWorldBank,
gaining access to European markets and, eventually, joining the World Trade Organization.
These powerful external forces made the embrace of regional economic integration newly
attractive.36
The revival and expansion of ECOWAS was embodied in a new agreement, the 1993
Treaty,37 that replaced the 1975 founding charter. The 1993 Treaty recommittedWest Afri-
can governments to economic integration, setting timetables for establishing the customs and
monetary unions, and further reducing barriers to intraregional trade. Themember states also
endorsed structural changes to achieve these goals.They authorized certainECOWASdecisions
28 ASANTE, supra note 16, at 42–43; GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 42–43; KUFUOR, supra note 12, at xii.
29 KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 27.
30 Id. at 26–29.
31 GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 44; Jebuni, supra note 13, at 495.
32 E.g., KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 19–34; Jebuni, supra note 13, at 490–99.
33 GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 47.
34 E.g., Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, Art. 2.1,
May 29, 1979, at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id!protocole&lang!en; see also ASANTE, supra
note 16, at 151 (“As far as ECOWAS is concerned, the movement of labor is part of the philosophy of its
founders . . . .”).
35 Okolo, supra note 24, at 432–33; GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 47.
36 KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 42–43.
37 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, July 24, 1993, 35 ILM 660 [hereinafter
1993 Treaty].
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tobe adoptedby a vote of two-thirds of themember states,made thosedecisions expressly bind-
ing on the member states, created new ECOWAS institutions such as the Community Parlia-
ment,38 and increased the power of existing bodies.39
Although the 1993 Treaty reads primarily as a recommitment to economic integration, in
practice the second phase of ECOWAS came to be dominated by security, good governance,
and human rights concerns. Early on, the Community had acquired a role in promoting
regional security. A 1978 Protocol on Non-aggression40 and a 1981 Protocol Relating to
Mutual Assistance on Defense41 provided the legal basis for these tasks. These initiatives were
primarily aimedat deflecting foreign interventions, but they also established aDefenseCouncil
and Defense Commission that could more broadly supervise regional security initiatives.42
The Liberian civil war marked a turning point. Although there had been previous conflicts
in the region, the civil war in that country led Anglophonemember states to establish the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).43What began as
a monitoring and mediation effort as part of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense
became a full-fledged military intervention.44 Most observers credited the intervention with
preventing the spreadof violence and restoring a semblanceof stability inLiberia.But the inter-
vention also generated credible and serious allegations of human rights abuses by ECOMOG
forces.45 Subsequent military missions to quell civil wars and armed conflicts in Sierra Leone
in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1999, and Coˆte d’Ivoire and Liberia in 2003 increased the political
salience of security and humanitarian activities in ECOWAS and led to the adoption in 1999
of a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security (1999Conflict Prevention Protocol) that underscored the impor-
tance of protecting human rights and put regional intervention on a firmer legal footing.46
These expansions of the Community’s powers contributed to a growing mobilization around
38 Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament, Aug. 6, 1994, at http://www.parl.ecowas.int/
doc/protocols_eng.pdf.
39 For an overview of the 1993 Treaty, see KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 35–68; Iwa Akinrinsola, Legal and Insti-
tutional Requirements for West African Economic Integration, 10 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 493, 504–08 (2004).
40 Apr. 22, 1978, in COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS PEACE & SECURITY DECISIONS 57 (Emmanuel Kwesi
Aning, Emma Birikorang & Thomas Jaye eds., 2010), at http://www.kaiptc.org/getattachment/Media-
Room/News/Compendium-of-ECOWAS-Peace-and-Security-Decisions/Compendium-of-ECOWAS-Peace-and-
Security-Decisions.pdf.aspx.
41 A/SP3/5/8l,May 29, 1981, inCOMPENDIUMOF ECOWAS PEACE& SECURITYDECISIONS, supra note 40,
at 61.
42 See Peter Jenkins, The Economic Community of West African States and the Regional Use of Force, 32 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 333, 335–36 (2008).
43 JOHN M. KABIA, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA
57–160 (2009); see alsoADEKEYE ADEBAJO& ISMAILO. D. RASHID,WEST AFRICA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES:
BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED REGION (2004).
44 See Jenkins, supra note 42, at 342–44.
45 E.g., Peter Arthur, ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future,
57 AFRICA TODAY 2, 16 (2010); KABIA, supra note 43, at 86–87.
46 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping
and Security, Art. 2, Dec. 10, 1999 (declaring as a “fundamental principles” the “protection of fundamental
human rights and freedoms and the rules of international humanitarian laws”), in COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS
PEACE& SECURITYDECISIONS, supra note 40, at 61; see also Isaac Terwase Sampson,The Responsibility to Protect
and ECOWAS Mechanisms on Peace and Security: Assessing Their Convergence and Divergence on Intervention,
16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 507, 515–18 (2011).
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human rights in West Africa, and as we explain in part IV, opened the door for the transfor-
mation of the ECOWAS Court into an international human rights court.
As part of the 1993 overhaul, member states agreed to broaden public participation in
ECOWAS by expanding access for civil society groups. National NGOs were precluded from
participating in Community policymaking, but regional civil society groups could be accred-
ited to observe public meetings, make presentations, and circulate documents.47 These insti-
tutional reforms created an incentive for civil society groups to mobilize within ECOWAS and
to create regional advocacy bodies. In 2001, NGOs formed the West African Human Rights
Forum, an umbrella organization that gained accreditation from ECOWAS and attempted to
influence Community policymaking.48 These opportunities for regional mobilization pro-
vided an avenue in 2004 for human rights groups to contribute to proposals to expand the
Court’s jurisdiction. NGO access was also important five years later when the Gambian gov-
ernment, unhappywithCourt’s rulings against it, proposed curbing its newly acquired author-
ity to hear human rights cases.
Another expansion of ECOWAS competence was an important precursor for the ECOWAS
Court’s transformation. In 2001, the member states adopted a Protocol on Democracy and
Good Governance (2001 Good Governance Protocol) to deter military coups and unconsti-
tutional changes of government.49TheProtocolwovemultiple references to human rights into
the fabric of an ambitious regional effort to promote democracy, accountability, transparency,
and the rule of law.50 It also included a clause promising that the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS
Court “shall be reviewed so as to give the Court the power to hear, inter-alia, cases relating to
violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national level have
failed.”51 These developments gave human rights advocates a legal foothold when they later
lobbied to give the Court a human rights jurisdiction.
The Decision to Create a Community Court of Justice for Interstate Disputes
We now situate the creation of the ECOWAS Court within these wider regional develop-
ments. ECOWAS’s founders envisioned a tribunal to “ensure the observance of law and justice
in the interpretation of the provisions of [the 1975] Treaty” and to “settl[e] such disputes as
may be referred to it” by the member states.52 But the tribunal was never created during the
founding period for two reasons. The first relates to Nigeria’s regional hegemony. ECOWAS
47 Decision A/DEC.9/8/94 Establishing Regulations for the Grant to Non-governmental Organisations
(NGOs) the Status of Observer Within the Institutions of the Community, Aug. 6, 1994, discussed in KUFUOR,
supra note 12, at 49–50.
48 Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate B (Feb. 3, 2011).
49 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Dec. 21, 2001
[hereinafter 2001 Good Governance Protocol], at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol
%20on%20good-governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf. For a recent assessment, see Frederick Cowell, The
Impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, 19 AFR. J. INT’L AND COMP. L. 331 (2011).
50 See Solomon T. Ebobrah, Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights Realisation Through Regional
Economic Communities in Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States 100–02 (2009)
(LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria), at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02102010-085034/
unrestricted/00front.pdf.
51 2001 Good Governance Protocol, supra note 49, Art. 39.
52 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, supra note 11, Arts. 11, 56.
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institutions have always depended on the largesse of Nigerian oil revenues, and Nigeria was
reluctant to embrace “anorgan that could circumscribe its role as the regional hegemon.”53The
second relates to the weak legal underpinnings for a Community court. ECOWAS protocols
did not have direct effect in national law,54 and as noted above,most were rarely implemented.
In an environment in whichmember states neither implemented nor complied withCommu-
nity rules, a supranational tribunal would have been “largely redundant.”55
The decision to create the ECOWAS Court was part of the broader recommitment to
regional integration in the early 1990s.56 As governments prepared to relaunch the Commu-
nity, national interior ministers submitted to the member states a proposal to create a court.
Theministerswanted a court to resolve disputes relating to keyECOWAS instruments andpro-
grams, including the Protocol on FreeMovement of Persons, Residence and Establishment,57
the Trade Liberalisation Scheme, the Agricultural Cooperation Programme, and the Protocol
on Community Enterprises.58 The renewed governmental support for a court in the early
1990s reflected a growing sense that deeper regional integration required a judicial body to
resolve disputes and interpret legal rules.59
A 1991 Community protocol (1991 Protocol) created an international court to carry out
these tasks.60 The Protocol authorized the ECOWAS Court to adjudicate two types of cases
relating to “the interpretation and application” of ECOWAS legal instruments: (1) “disputes
referred . . . byMember States or theAuthority, when such disputes arise between theMember
States or between one or more Member States and the Institutions of the Community,” and
(2) proceedings instituted by a member state “on behalf of its nationals . . . against another
Member State or Institution of the Community . . . after attempts to settle the dispute ami-
cably have failed.”61
The 1991 Protocol also included what, in retrospect, was a portentous decision: it estab-
lished the ECOWASCourt as a permanent institution. At the time, member states were uncer-
tainwhat kindof judicial body theCommunityneeded.Officials in theECOWASLegalAffairs
Directorate favored an adhoc tribunal,whichwouldbe less costly and appropriate for the small
number of interstate disputes capable of judicial resolution. Member states, however, were
53 KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 44.
54 Akinrinsola, supra note 39, at 503.
55 Id. at 504.
56 Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 19–21; LADAN, supra note 16, at 2.
57 See supra note 34.
58 Protocol A/P1/11/84 Relating to Community Enterprises, Nov. 23, 1984; see ECOWAS Ministers of Justice
Meet in Lagos, 2CONTACTMAG., no. 3, 1990, at 15 (on filewith authors) (reporting statements by ECOWASDep-
uty Executive Secretary Adelino Queta).
59 Akinrinsola, supra note 39, at 507–08; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, Securing Compliance with the Judgements of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1996).
60 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on theCommunityCourt of Justice, Arts. 3(1), 4(1), July 6, 1991 [hereinafter 1991Pro-
tocol], provided for a court comprising seven independent judges, each of whom served for a five-year term
renewable once. The judges were appointed “by the Authority and selected from a list of persons nominated by
Member States” who had qualifications similar to those associated with other international courts and tribunals.
Id., Art. 3(1), (4).
61 Id., Art. 9(2), (3). The 1991 Protocol also authorized the ECOWASCourt to issue advisory opinions concern-
ing the Treaty “at the request of the Authority, Council, one or more Member States, or the Executive Secretary
and any other institution of the Community.” Id., Art. 10(1).
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more focused on expanding ECOWAS competences and creating new Community institu-
tions. In this heady atmosphere of supranational expansion, “the Authority said, ‘let’s have a
court.’”62
The 1991Protocol did not, however, include another design feature favored by the support-
ers of supranational integration—a provision granting private litigants access to the Court. As
part of a review process leading to the restructuring of ECOWAS in the 1993 Treaty, the
Authority appointed aCommittee of Eminent Persons, chaired byGeneral YakubuGowon of
Nigeria, to assess the shortcomings of the founding period. The committee’s reports to the
Authority stressed the “importance of [private actors and] interest groups in the integration
process,” both in the interests of democratic legitimacy and because “some of the Community
decisions have to be implemented either directly or indirectly” by these actors.63 The commit-
tee also endorsed granting individuals, firms, and interest groups access to the Court:
Where, however, a Community citizen alleges a breach or denial of a right conferred on
him by a Community legislation, a Treaty provision or a protocol, it should be possible
for him to seek redress in the national Court or the Community Court of Justice. . . . This
proposal would also require amendment to Article 9 of the [1991] Protocol . . . . Under
the present provisions, nationals do not have a locus standi in theCourt of Justice.Member
States have to act on their behalf, and even so, only in cases relating to the interpretation
and application of the provisions of the Treaty, “after attempts to settle the dispute ami-
cably have failed.”64
We do not knowwhy themember states did not act on this proposal. Perhaps it was politically
expedient not to deviate from a design template that the ECOWAS Authority had previously
vetted and approved. Or perhaps the member states, especially Nigeria, did not actually want
a tribunal with design features that would enhance the supranational aspects of ECOWAS or
constrain their freedom of action.65
The delay in establishing the ECOWASCourt as a working court is consistent with the latter
explanation. The 1991 Protocol did not enter into force until November 1996.66 Even then,
the Court existed only on paper. The situation changed in 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo
assumed the presidency of Nigeria. Obasanjo increased the country’s international profile, in
part by reviving its leadership of the Community.67 With the region’s economic powerhouse
62 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 7, 2011).
63 Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty, Draft Report 28, ECOWAS Doc.
ECW/CEP/TREV/VI/2 ( June 1992) [hereinafter Draft CEP Report] (on file with authors); Final CEP Report,
supra note 14, at 23–24 (containing a similar statement).
64 Final CEPReport, supra note 14, at 20–21;Draft CEPReport, supra note 63, at 20. Elsewhere, the final report
suggests that the committee’s recommendation was for private litigants to have direct access to the ECOWASCourt
rather than access via national courts. Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 8.
65 Several scholars have argued that private access contributes to the effectiveness of international courts. See, e.g.,
Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 472–76 (2000); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 287–90. Other scholars
have applied this insight to subregional courts inAfrica. See, e.g., RICHARDFRIMPONGOPPONG, LEGALASPECTS
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 119 (2011).
66 The Protocol was provisionally effective from the date of its conclusion in 1991, but it did not enter into force
“definitively” until it had been ratified by seven member states. 1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 34.
67 E.g., JOHN ILIFFE, OBASANJO, NIGERIA AND THE WORLD 129, 217–24 (2011); J. Shola Omotola, From
Importer to Exporter: The Changing Role of Nigeria in PromotingDemocratic Values in Africa, inAFRICANPOLITICS:
BEYOND THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATISATION 31, 39 ( Joelien Pretorius ed., 2008).
2013] 747A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST AFRICA
once again favoring integration, ECOWAS institutions—including the Court—became a pri-
ority. InDecember 2000, themember states appointed the first seven judges, who were sworn
into office on January 31, 2001. The judges picked Hansine Donli as the Court’s president.
Donli was a natural choice to lead the Court. As a Nigerian with a network of contacts in the
country, it would be easier for her to arrange for the infrastructure and administrative support
that the judges required.68
Among the Court’s initial tasks was finding courtrooms and offices for the judges, the chief
registrar, and their staffs.69 The judges secured the construction of a new building in Abuja,
paid for by Nigeria. They next began outreach efforts to attract cases.70 According to Donli,
member states were largely unaware of “the need to seek [the Court’s] advice with respect [to]
the different problems they will be facing, arising from interpretation of the Treaty and Pro-
tocols.”71 Notwithstanding these outreach efforts, however, the ECOWAS Court remained
idle for nearly three years after opening its doors for business.
II. EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION AND ACCESS RULES OF THE ECOWASCOURT
Themember states created the ECOWASCourt to adjudicate interstate economic disputes.
But in the wake of the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, and as human rights NGOs
became more active in regional policymaking—an involvement made possible by the Com-
munity’s new openness to civil society—theNGOs saw an opportunity to redeploy an existing
institution to promote their objectives. They focused on a provision in the 2001 Good Gov-
ernance Protocol that suggested that the not-yet-operational Court might one day hear “cases
relating to violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national
level have failed.”72 In 2001, such a possibility seemed remote. In this part we explain how
advocates transformed that vague promise into a reality.
The opportunity for change presented itself following the Court’s first decision—Afolabi v.
Nigeria—a case challenging blatant noncompliance with ECOWAS free-movement rules.73
We first review the Court’s dismissal of the case and then explain how ECOWAS judges, civil
society groups, and ECOWAS officials lobbied the member states to expand the Court’s juris-
diction. We then consider how these actors created an international human rights court with
design features different from other human rights tribunals.
68 Interview with judges at the headquarters of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in Abuja, Nigeria
(Mar. 11, 2011); Adelanwa Bamgboye,Nigeria: Some Judges Are Strong Even at 80—Hansine Donli, DAILY TRUST
(Nigeria) (Sept. 28, 2010), at http://allafrica.com/stories/201009280476.html. Although the news archive at
AllAfrica.com requires a subscription, each of the links to that archive leads to aweb pagewith the first few sentences
of the article, information about its publication, and a link to the full article. All sources cited from AllAfrica.com
are also on file with authors.
69 The ECOWAS Court was initially located in Lagos, Nigeria. It moved to its permanent headquarters in the
capital of Abuja afterNigeriawas designated in 2002 as the host country of theCourt. Adewale Banjo,The ECOWAS
Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa, 32 AFR. DEV. 69, 77 (2007).
70 Interviewwith judges at the headquarters of the ECOWASCommunity Court of Justice, supra note 68; see also
LillianOkenwa,LawPersonality: ‘ECOWASCourt JurisdictionWill BeExpanded,’ALLAFRICA.COM(Sept. 21, 2004)
(describing outreach efforts by ECOWAS judges), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200409210061.html.
71 Banjo, supra note 69, at 77.
72 2001 Good Governance Protocol, supra note 49, Art. 39.
73 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03, Judgment (Apr. 27, 2004), reprinted in 2004–2009
COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT 1 (2011).
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The AfolabiCase: Justice Denied for Private Litigants
Olajide Afolabi was a Nigerian trader who had entered into a contract to purchase goods in
Benin. Afolabi could not complete the transaction becauseNigeria unilaterally closed the bor-
der between the two countries. He filed suit with the ECOWASCourt, alleging that the border
closure violated the right to free movement of persons and goods.74
Nigeria challenged the Court’s jurisdiction and Afolabi’s standing, arguing that the 1991
Protocol did not authorize private parties to litigate before the Court. Afolabi countered by
invoking a Protocol provision stating that a “Member State may, on behalf of its nationals,
institute proceedings against another member State.”75 He asserted that the word “may” per-
mits states to raise such cases but does not preclude the Court from receiving complaints from
individuals.76 Afolabi also argued that when a private party sues his own country, that nation
“cannot represent the party because the Member State cannot be both the plaintiff and the
defender.”77 Finally, Afolabi invoked “the principles of equity”78 in the 1991 Protocol to sup-
port an expansive interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction.79
The Court rejected each of these arguments and dismissed the suit. The judges acknowl-
edged that Afolabi’s complaint raised “a serious claim touching on free movement and free
movement of goods,”80 but they reasoned that an ECOWAS legal instrument must expressly
grant the Court jurisdiction. Article 9 of the 1991 Protocol is “plain” and “unambiguous” on
this issue: only states can institute proceedings on behalf of their nationals.81 The Protocol
must therefore be applied as written, even if the result—insulating states against suits by their
own nationals alleging violations of ECOWAS rules—seems “repugnant,” “absurd[],” or
“harsh.”82
The ECOWASCourt also rejectedAfolabi’s broad interpretation of theword “equity” in the
1991 Protocol, comparing it to a similar provision in the Treaty Establishing the European
Community.83 According to the Court, “activist[] judges” on the European Court of Justice
had applied this provision to “define the role of the [European] court very broadly,” “to extend
its review on jurisdiction to cover bodies which were not listed in the Treaty,” and “to fill in
gaps in treaties.”84 The ECOWAS judges candidly declared that, because “some of the [ECJ’s]
decisions [have] attracted criticisms,” “[w]e . . . do not want to tow on the same line.”85
TheAfolabi casewas a paradigmatic illustrationof the serious physical and legal barriers con-
fronting the region’s importers and exporters. Like the ECJ before it, the ECOWAS Court
74 Afolabi invoked this right as guaranteed in the 1993 Treaty, supra note 37, Protocol A/P.1/5/79 (free move-
ment), supra note 34, and the African Charter, supra note 7. Id., para. 7.
75 1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 9(3) (emphasis added).
76 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 73, paras. 14, 23.
77 Id., para. 15.
78 1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 9(1) (“The Court shall ensure the observance of law and of the principles
of equity in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty.”).
79 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 73, para. 41.
80 Id., para. 55.
81 Id., paras. 59, 61.
82 Id., paras. 37, 54.
83 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Art. 164, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 UNTS 3 (requiring
the ECJ to “ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of this Treaty”).
84 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 73, para. 56.
85 Id.
2013] 749A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST AFRICA
could have adopted a purposive interpretation ofCommunity economic rules to enable private
traders to challenge those barriers. Instead, the judges responded with restraint. They strictly
interpreted the 1991 Protocol and concluded that only ECOWASmember states could autho-
rize the Court to review complaints from private actors.
The Coordinated Campaign by Nonstate Actors to Redesign the ECOWAS Court, and the
Surprising Absence of Member State Opposition
The dismissal of the Afolabi suit exposed a basic flaw in the Court’s architecture: gov-
ernments had little incentive to challenge barriers to regional integration, and private traders
had no judicial mechanism for doing so. Responding to this flaw, ECOWAS judges, NGOs,
and Community officials launched a campaign to expand the Court’s jurisdiction. The cam-
paign succeeded, but the institutional reforms did not address the unsatisfactory outcome in
Afolabi. Instead, the changes gave the ECOWAS Court a capacious human rights mandate.
In this section, we describe the coordinated campaign by ECOWAS judges, NGOs, and
Community officials to lobby for giving the Court jurisdiction over human rights cases. We
also explore the surprising lack of member state opposition to the campaign. In part IV, we
return to these events to explain why court reform omitted private litigant access in economic
cases.
ECOWAS judges had long recognized the problems that the Afolabi case illustrated. As one
judge explained in an interview: “Individuals started to come and asked us if they had access
to the Court. They were surprised because ECOWAS has Protocols that affected them—such
as free movement of people and goods—and they didn’t understand how the Protocols were
supposed to be effective.” The judges were discussing how to address the situation when
Afolabi filed his complaint in October 2003. The case’s sympathetic facts “assisted us in mak-
ing a proposal” to expand theCourt’s jurisdiction, relying on a clause in the 1991Protocol that
invites such proposals.86
In contrast to the narrow, formalist analysis of the Afolabi decision, the judges raised ex-
pansive policy arguments outside the courtroom to lobby for an overhaul of the 1991Protocol.
On the same day that the Court released the Afolabi judgment, it also issued a press release
urging governments “to enable individuals to bring actions before the court as there are cases
member states cannot bring on behalf of [their] nationals.”87TheCourt also published a book-
let that summarized the legal arguments of parties in Afolabi and the judgment dismissing the
suit. The judges distributed the booklet widely to show that they had finally issued a decision
and to highlight the flaws in the ECOWAS legal system.88 During the next several months, in
meetings with lawyers, civil society groups, and government officials, and in statements to the
86 Interview with judges at the headquarters of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, supra note 68;
1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 33(1) (providing that “the President of the Court may . . . submit proposals for
amendments of this Protocol”).
87 LillianOkenwa, ECOWASCourtNotOpen to Individual Litigants, THISDAY (Nigeria) (Apr. 28, 2004) (on file
with authors); see also ECOWAS Throws Out Suit Against Nigeria over Land Border Closure with Benin, VANGUARD
(Nigeria) (Apr. 28, 2004), 2004 WLNR 7109799.
88 During interviews at the FederalMinistry ofTrade andCommerce ofNigeria,March 8, 2011, inAbuja,Nige-
ria, we were shown the booklet and discussed how it had been distributed.
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news media,89 the judges continued to publicize the need to provide access for private liti-
gants.90
Regional bar associations and human rights groups joined the judges’ campaign. The focus
on human rights issues in ECOWAS—which, as part I explained, began with the abuses linked
to ECOMOG’s humanitarian interventions—expanded during the ensuing decade as civil
society groups capitalized on the shift to more democratic governments, the rebranding of
ECOWAS as a “people-centered” institution, and the enhanced access rules for transnational
NGOs.91
Shortly after the Court dismissed the Afolabi case, human rights groups seized the oppor-
tunity for court reform.92 Leaders of the West African Bar Association met with ECOWAS
judges and staff to press the case for “a Court that could address human rights issues.”93
With the judges’ support, bar association attorneys consulted with other NGOs and
ECOWAS officials to develop a proposal to revise the Court’s jurisdiction. The key stake-
holders met in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2004 at a consultative forum organized by the
Open Society Initiative for West Africa.94 The forum issued a declaration calling for the
89 E.g., Lillian Okenwa, Broaden ECOWAS Court’s Jurisdiction, THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Sept. 2, 2004), at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200409020666.html; Justice Aminata Malle Sanogo, Practice and Procedure in
ECOWASCourt, paper presented at the 2007AnnualGeneral Conference of theNigerianBar Association at Ilorin,
Kwara State, Nigeria (Aug. 26–31, 2007), quoted inA.O. Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court
Protocol and the Constitutions of Member States, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 111, 117 (2010).
90 The judges appear to have favored giving private litigants access to the Court in both economic and human
rights cases:
[T]he right of access to the Court is the keystone in the development of the Community law. The promotion
andprotection of human rights and fundamental freedoms ofCommunityCitizens cannot be ensured, if right
of direct access to the Community Court of Justice is not guaranteed. A cardinal objective of ECOWAS is the
formation of an economic union and a commonmarket. . . . [T]his scheme and the intended benefits cannot
be realized, unless individuals, consumers, manufacturers and corporate bodies that are the prime movers in
commercial transactions have direct access to the Court of Justice.
ECOWAS: Court Procedure and the Application of Protocols 10–12 (n.d.), at http://www.crin.org/docs/ecowas
procedure.doc.Circumstantial evidence suggests that theCourt prepared this document. Specifically, in press inter-
views ECOWAS judges echoed similar themes. See, e.g., LillianOkenwa, ECOWASCourt: Individuals to Have Access,
THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Feb. 9, 2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200502090527.html. In part IV, we discuss
why access for private litigants alleging violations of ECOWAS economic rules was dropped from the court reform
agenda.
91 Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate A ( Jan. 11, 2011); Telephone interview with Human
Rights Advocate B, supra note 48; Interview with Human Rights Advocate F, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 7, 2011);
Interview with Human Rights Advocate H, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 10, 2011). In 2002, Mohammed Ibn
Chambas, ECOWAS’s executive secretary from 2002 to 2006, committed to making the Community a “people-
centered” institution and expanding access to civil society and the public. Interview with Mohamed Ibn
Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, UN INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK (Mar. 12,
2002), at http://www.irinnews.org/report/30701/west-africa-irin-interview-with-mohamed-ibn-chambas-
executive-secretary-of-ecowas.
92 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 9, 2011); Telephone interview with
Human Rights Advocate B, supra note 48.
93 InterviewwithHumanRightsAdvocateC, supranote 92; see alsoFemiFalana,TheCommunityCourt of Justice,
ECOWAS and the Experiences of Other Regional Courts, inCOMPENDIUMOFTHE INTERNATIONALCONFERENCE
ON “THE LAW IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA,” ABUJA, NIGERIA (NOV. 13–14, 2007)
143, 145 (after the Afolabi judgment, the “West African Bar Association collaborated with the Court in the cam-
paign” to give private actors direct access to the ECOWAS Court “for the enforcement of their human rights”).
94 The Consultative Forum on Protecting the Rights of ECOWASCitizens Through the ECOWASCourt of Jus-
tice was held in Dakar, Senegal on October 18–20, 2004. See http://aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/ECOWAS
_Community_Court_of_Justice.
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urgent adoption of a protocol to give individuals direct access to the Court in human rights
cases.95
At this stage, officials in the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat became key players. The sec-
retariat had long supported making ECOWAS more relevant to civil society and adding a
human rightsmandate to Community legal texts and institutions.96 Its officials were also frus-
trated by the Court’s budgetary needs. The Court is a permanent judicial body. But with no
cases on its docket, the Court was, in the words of one official, a “huge body with nothing to
do.”97 The secretariat wanted to give the judges and staff enough work to justify the large
expenditure of Community resources.98
The secretariat’s backing greatly increased the likelihood that the member states would
approve the protocol advocated by ECOWAS judges and NGOs. We asked officials in the
Legal Affairs Directorate how national political leaders viewed the court reform proposal.
“They trusted us” was the response:
When we draft [legal] texts, we consult a lot. We write memoranda that explain why we
aremaking the proposal.We exchange viewswith themember states.Member states com-
ment on the draft proposals before we convey any draft legislation. We incorporate all of
this input before the actual meeting where the proposal is discussed.99
Notwithstanding the ECOWAS secretariat’s support for the proposal, the absence of gov-
ernment opposition to giving the Court a human rights mandate is striking. We queried
numerous stakeholders to probe for such opposition. They all responded that the proposal was
approved without much controversy. By all appearances, that is accurate. We found no evi-
dence that individual countries, ormember states collectively, attempted to block, stall, or nar-
row the protocol. Nonetheless, civil society groups recognized that they needed to “mobilize”
to secure the protocol’s adoption—in particular, by soliciting the support of sympathetic
governments.100 They met with the president of Senegal (the only nation in West Africa
never ruled by a military dictatorship), arguing that a human rights court was “especially
needed for countries whose legal and judicial systems are weak.”101 The president agreed to
support the protocol at thenextmeeting of theECOWASAuthority.TheNGOsalso consulted
officials from the justice and integration ministries in several countries, and conferred with
the staff of the ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate, which was preparing the final draft of the
protocol.102
Barely ninemonths after the dismissal of theAfolabi case, the coordinated court reformcam-
paign reached a successful conclusion. On January 19, 2005, the member states adopted the
95 Id.; Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92; Nneoma Nwogu, Regional Integration as an
Instrument of Human Rights: Reconceptualizing ECOWAS, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 345, 352 (2007).
96 Nwogu, supra note 95, at 350.
97 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62.
98 Id.; Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 7, 2011).
99 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, supra note 98.
100 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92; Telephone interview with Human Rights
Advocate B, supra note 48.
101 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
102 Id.
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2005 Protocol by consensus andwith immediate provisional effect.103 The Protocolmarkedly
expands the ECOWASCourt’s authority,most notably by giving theCourt a capacious human
rights mandate.
The Distinctive Features of the ECOWAS Court’s Human Rights Jurisdiction
The 2005 Protocol’s most important clauses appear in two short sentences in articles rede-
fining the ECOWASCourt’s jurisdiction and access rules. Article 3 revises Article 9 of the 1991
Protocol and lists each ground of jurisdiction. The fourth paragraph states: “The Court has
jurisdiction to determine case[s] of violation of human rights that occur in any Member
State.”104 Article 4, which adds a new Article 10 to the 1991 Protocol, identifies the litigants
who have access to the ECOWAS Court. It includes a subparagraph authorizing the Court to
receive complaints from “individuals on application for relief for violation of their human
rights.”105 On first impression, these simple provisions appear straightforward. In reality, they
mask three design features that collectively gave the ECOWAS Court much broader authority
than other human rights tribunals.
Direct access for private litigants.First, the ECOWASCourt is unusual for a newhuman rights
court in granting direct access to private litigants. For the vast majority of cases in the African
andAmericanhuman rights systems (and in theEuropean systemprior to1998), complainants
must first submit their allegations to a quasi-judicial commission that screens complaints and
issues nonbinding recommendations for those petitions that it deems admissible. Review by
a court with the power to issue a legally binding judgment occurs only if a state has voluntarily
accepted the court’s jurisdiction and if the commission or the state refers the case for a judicial
resolution.106
This tiered review structure—a commission to vet complaints, optional jurisdiction, and
limiting the actors who can refer cases to a court—provides states withmultiple layers of polit-
ical protection. In the African Charter system, for example, private litigants have direct access
to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights only if the respondent state has ratified
the protocol establishing the Court and filed a separate optional declaration allowing private
litigants to submit such complaints. To date, only seven of fifty-four African nations—four of
them ECOWAS member states—have filed such declarations.107
The ECOWAS Court lacks any of these political buffers. ECOWAS judges have repeatedly
affirmed that private litigants “have direct access to . . . the Court when their human rights are
103 2005 Protocol, supra note 10, Art. 11 (providing that the protocol “shall enter into force provisionally
upon signature by theHeads of State andGovernment” and “shall definitively enter into force upon the ratification
by at least nine (9) signatory States”).
104 Id., Art. 3 (revising Art. 9(4) of the 1991 Protocol).
105 Id., Art. 4 (inserting Art. 10(d) into the 1991 Protocol). Article 10(d) also provides that applications alleging
human rights violations may not be anonymous and many not be made while the same matter is pending before
another international court.
106 Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AJIL 783, 791–801 (2006).
107 Only twenty-six of fifty-four African Charter member states have ratified the African Court Protocol.
Seven of these twenty-six states—Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, and Tanzania—
have filed separate optional declarations giving private litigants direct access the Africa Court. See Coˆte d’Ivoire
Deposits the Declaration Allowing Individuals Direct Access ( July 31, 2013), at http://www.african-court.org/
en/index.php/news/latest-news/426-the-republic-of-cote-d-ivoire-deposits-the-declaration-allowing-individuals-
and-ngos-direct-access-to-the-african-court.
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violated.”108 The judges have extended access not only to individuals—who are expressly
mentioned in the 2005 Protocol—but to NGOs.109 They have also rejected attempts by
governments to circumvent the direct access provision, rebuffing arguments that human
rights are matters essentially within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, that ECOWAS treaties
and protocols have no domestic effect, and that direct access for NGOs should be denied
because litigants have no standing to challenge human rights violations before national
courts.110
An indeterminate human rights jurisdiction.A seconddistinctive feature of theCourt’s design
is that no ECOWAS legal instrument prescribes which human rights its judges can adjudicate.
The primary role of the European, Inter-American, andAfrican courts is to interpret and apply
their respective regional human rights charters.111 Their association with these instruments
provides a sanctioned source of law and legal authority for their judges. By contrast, ECOWAS
judges havenodesignatedhuman rights charter to apply.Bydeclining todesignate a prescribed
catalogue of rights, the 2005 Protocol avoided provoking political controversy over which
rights the ECOWASCourt could review.The absence such of an enumerated list, however, also
presented risks for the Court—namely, that its new human rights jurisdiction could be chal-
lenged as an overbroad delegation to interpret expansively this rapidly evolving area of inter-
national law. As we later explain, the Court is also open to the charge that it applies human
rights instruments that are not legally binding.112
ECOWAS judges have viewed the lack of designated human rights norms as an “opportunity
to define and delimit the scope and legal parameters of its human rights mandate in its own
image.”113TheCourt has underscored the primacy of theAfrican human rights system, noting
that all ECOWASmember states are parties to the African Charter, which is also referenced in
108 Tidjani v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/06, Judgment, para. 22 ( July 28, 2007).
109 E.g., Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Rul-
ing, paras. 59–61 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter SERAPNiger Delta Ruling]; Socio-Economic Rights and Account-
ability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, Ruling, paras. 33–34 (Oct. 27, 2009), [hereinafter
SERAP Basic Education Ruling]. By contrast, the Court has held that “no corporate body can bring a human rights
case before this court as a plaintiff as an alleged victim of human rights abuse.” Starcrest Investment Ltd. v. Nigeria,
Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/08, Judgment, para. 17 ( July 8, 2011).
110 E.g., SERAP Basic Education Ruling, supra note 109, paras. 18–20; Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Case
No. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07, Ruling, para. 39 ( June 30, 2009).
111 Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 301 (1999). For example,
the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-AmericanCourt ofHumanRights “relatesmainly to the application of the
[American Convention on Human Rights], but has also been extended to a few other regional human rights trea-
ties.” Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101, 102 (2008). The Court’s advisory jurisdiction is wider, extending to the interpretation
of other human rights treaties ratified by Organization of American States member states. Id. at 102 & n.2. The
jurisdiction of the AfricanCourt onHuman and Peoples’ Rights is broader still. It applies principally to the African
Charter but also extends to “other relevant Human Rights instrument[s] ratified by the States concerned” (con-
tentious jurisdiction) and “any other relevant human rights instruments” (advisory jurisdiction). Protocol to the
African Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court onHuman and Peoples’
Rights, Arts. 3, 4, June 10, 1998, OAUDoc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (entered into force Jan. 25,
2004).
112 See Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 93; Solomon T. Ebobrah, Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, 54 J. AFR. L. 1, 3–7 (2010) [hereinafter Ebobrah, Critical Issues].
113 TonyAnene-Maidoh, TheMandate of a Regional Court: Experiences fromECOWASCourt of Justice, paper
presented at the Regional Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal, Johannesburg (Mar. 12–13, 2013) (statement by
ECOWAS Court chief registrar).
754 [Vol. 107:737THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the 1993 Treaty.114 But ECOWAS judges also regularly apply the Universal Declaration of
HumanRights andUNhuman rights conventions thatmember states have ratified,115 includ-
ing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,116 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,117 and the UN Convention Against Torture.118
The ECOWAS Court also considers a broad array of other sources when interpreting hu-
man rights norms. The Court draws inspiration from the 1991 Protocol’s directive to “apply,
as necessary, thebodyof laws as contained inArticle 38of theStatute of the InternationalCourt
of Justice,”119 which, in turn, specifies that treaties, custom, and general principles of law, as
well as national judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists, are all sources
of international law.120TheCourthas reliedon this provision to consult awide arrayof binding
and hortatory international human rights instruments and national laws.121 In Hadijatou
Mani Kouraou v. Niger, for example, the judges cited a multiplicity of sources in reaffirming
the peremptory norm against slavery, and they endorsed the definition of modern forms of
slavery adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.122
No requirement to first exhaust domestic remedies. The ECOWAS Court’s ability to hear
human rights cases is aided by the absence of a requirement to exhaust local remedies. In all
other regional and UN human rights petition systems, individuals must first seek relief in
national courts, administrative agencies, or other domestic venues.123 If a petitioner does not
exhaust such remedies—or explain why they are unavailable, ineffective, or insufficient—the
international tribunal will dismiss her complaint.124
114 E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/11, Judgment, para. 24 ( June 11, 2012); Keita v.Mali,
Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06, Judgment, para. 34 (Mar. 22, 2007).
115 E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 114, para. 25 (asserting the authority to interpret “UN Con-
ventions . . . acceded to by Member States of ECOWAS”).
116 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
117 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 3.
118 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 113.
119 1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 19.
120 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38.
121 E.g., David v. Uwechue, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/09, Ruling, para. 41 ( June 11, 2010) (“As an inter-
national court with jurisdiction over human rights violation[s,] the court cannot disregard the basic principles as
well as the practice that guide the adjudication of the disputes on human rights at the international level.”).
122 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07, Judgment, paras. 74–75, 77
(Oct. 27, 2008), unofficial translation available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/496b41fa2.pdf.
123 “The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-
established rule of customary international law[.]” Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 ICJ REP. 6, 27 (Mar. 21).
Some international agreements—most notably, bilateral investment treaties—intentionally omit an exhaustion
requirement. E.g., George K. Foster, Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The
Relevance of Local Remedies in InvestmentTreaty Arbitration, 49COLUM. J.TRANSNAT’LL. 201 (2011). For human
rights treaties, however, exhaustion is ubiquitous. For example, the AfricanCommission “can only deal with amat-
ter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious
to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.” African Charter,
supra note 7, Art. 50; see alsoOffice of the UnitedNationsHigh Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications, Procedure for Complaints by Individuals Under theHuman Rights
Treaties, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/individual.htm.
124 According to the African Commission, “A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it with-
out impediment; it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found sufficient if it is capable of
redressing the complaint.”Dawda Jawara v.TheGambia,Comm.Nos. 147/95&149/96, para. 31,AFR.COMM’N
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 13 ANN. ACTIVITY REP., Annex V (1999–2000), at http://www.achpr.
org/files/activity-reports/13/achpr26and27_actrep13_19992000_eng.pdf.
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In the human rights context, an exhaustion requirement acts as a buffer between domestic
and international legal systems. It “reinforces the subsidiary and complementary relationship
of the international system to systems of internal protection,”125 and reflects a belief that
domestic institutions should have “a first shot” at addressing human rights complaints.126 An
exhaustion rule also reduces “forum shopping and unnecessary rivalry betweenmunicipal and
international courts,” as well as the risk of conflicting decisions.127 Finally, it prevents inter-
national tribunals from being overburdened by a flood of human rights cases.128
Since granting the ECOWAS Court the authority to hear human rights cases, West African
governments have repeatedly asserted that individuals must exhaust domestic remedies before
petitioning the Court in Abuja. The judges have unwaveringly rebuffed these arguments, rea-
soning that the lack of an exhaustion rule is neither an inadvertent omission nor a flaw in the
Court’s human rightsmandate, but a deliberately chosen element of its judicial architecture.129
Just as the judges in the Afolabi case refused to imply jurisdiction over suits by private parties,
they have also held that non-exhaustion “cannot be taken away by implication” but requires
an express amendment of the 2005 Protocol.130Nor is the doctrine limited to situations where
litigants have bypassed national proceedings. The ECOWAS Court has also decided cases that
were pending before domestic courts,131 leading commentators to warn of potential conflicts
between ECOWAS and national judges.132
A Broad Authority for Human Rights Suits, but a NarrowerMandate for Economic Cases
Why did the member states agree to give the Court such expansive authority to adjudicate
human rights suits? And why did they allow direct access for human rights complaints but not
for suits alleging violations of ECOWAS economic rules?
In our interviews, stakeholders suggested several plausible explanations. First, states appear
to have accepted that the judges, secretariat officials, and civil society groups were acting in
good faith and within the scope of their delegated authority. Participants in the court reform
campaign underscored that their actions were consistent with ECOWAS rules. Community
legal texts expressly authorize the judges to propose changes to the 1991 Protocol. They also
125 NsongurnaUdombana, So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the AfricanCommission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AJIL 1, 9 (2003).
126 Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 88.
127 A.O. Enabulele, Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion ofDomestic Remedies and the ECOWASCommunity Court
of Justice, 56 J. AFR. L. 268 (2012).
128 Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 92.
129 E.g., Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Ruling, supra note 110, para. 43 (explaining that “the Supplementary Pro-
tocol is an example of legislating out of the rule of customary international law regarding the exhaustion of local
remedies”); Hadijatou Mani Kouraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122, para. 45 (rejecting the argument that
the lack of an exhaustion requirement is “a gap that should be filled” by judicial interpretation). Although states are
free to dispense with an exhaustion of local remedies requirement, they have almost never done so for international
human rights courts and review bodies. See supra note 123.
130 Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Ruling, supra note 110, para. 42.
131 E.g., Ayika v. Liberia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/11, Ruling (Dec. 19, 2011); Hadijatou Mani
Kouraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122.
132 Enabulele, supranote 127, at 293–94.The risk of conflict ismitigatedby theECOWASCourt’s repeated asser-
tion that it is not an appellate tribunal and will not generally review challenges to national court decisions. See, e.g.,
Keita v. Mali, Judgment, supra note 114, para. 31; Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 114, paras. 34–35.
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empower NGOs to participate in discussions in ECOWAS forums. As for the Executive Sec-
retariat, one of its key tasks is drafting protocols to ECOWAS legal instruments.
Second, all stakeholders supported giving the Court something to do. The frustration
with idle judges was a direct, albeit unintended, artifact of the earlier decision to make the
ECOWASCourt a full-time judicial body. The 2005 Protocol put cases on the Court’s docket,
and it gave member states a concrete way to fulfill their promise to make ECOWAS a more
people-centered organization. Moreover, Community legal texts—in particular, the 2001
GoodGovernance Protocol—had clearly envisioned giving a human rights jurisdiction to the
Court.
Third, human rights NGOs lobbied hard for a human rights jurisdiction and for the
specific design features that we have highlighted. They argued that exhaustion would make
it too difficult for West Africans to access the Court, especially since most countries “had
weak judiciaries” and lacked “any functioning human rights apparatus.”133 They also high-
lighted frustrations with the AfricanCommission onHuman and Peoples’ Rights’ slow review
of complaints and the spotty compliance with its nonbinding recommendations.134 ECOWAS
officials were receptive to the advocates’ concerns. They also recognized that an exhaustion
requirement would do little to remedy the lack of cases on the Court’s docket.135 As for the
lack of enumerated human rights, governments apparently assumed that the references to the
African Charter in the 1993 Treaty would lead the Court to view the Charter as the primary
source of human rights norms in ECOWAS.136
Fourth, observers stressed that the 2005 Protocol—like other ECOWAS protocols—en-
tered into force on a provisional basis.137 Governments may therefore have believed that the
Court’s human rights jurisdiction would be relatively easy to undo if the Court later be-
haved in ways that encroached on national sovereignty. The same rationale may also ex-
plain the protocol’s other design features. For example, ECOWAS officials characterized the
absence of an exhaustion requirement as an “experiment” that could be revisited in the
future.138 As we explain below, however, despite the nominally provisional status of the 2005
Protocol, its acceptance as an ongoing feature of the Court became a political, if not a legal,
fait accompli.
A final issue concerns the more circumscribed jurisdiction and access provisions for
cases unrelated to human rights. The 2005 Protocol authorizes the ECOWAS Court to inter-
pret allCommunity legal instruments and todetermine the “failure byMember States tohonor
their obligations” under those instruments.139 Only member states and ECOWAS officials,
133 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
134 Interview with Academic A, in Abuja, Nigeria, and by telephone (Feb.–Mar. 2011); see also FRANS
VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 297, 487 (2d ed. 2012) (reviewing the
“major impediments to the[] effectiveness and impact” of the African Commission on Human Rights and
describing the Commission’s “weaknesses . . . in providing a credible and timely forum for . . . recourse” to
victims).
135 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, supra note 98.
136 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
137 InterviewwithECOWASLegalAffairsDirectorateA, supranote 62;Telephone interviewwithHumanRights
Advocate A, supra note 91; Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate B, supra note 48; Interview with
ECOWAS Court Official C, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 11, 2011).
138 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62.
139 2005 Protocol, supra note 103, Art. 3 (revising Article 9(1)(a), (b) & (d) of the 1991 Protocol).
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however, can file such suits; individuals cannot.140 The Protocol does permit private actors
to challenge actions or omissions of Community officials,141 and it authorizes national
judges to refer to theCourt, either “on [their] own or at the request of any of the parties,” ques-
tions concerning the interpretation of ECOWAS legal texts.142 These reforms increase the
Court’s potential role in adjudicating challenges to noncompliance with ECOWAS eco-
nomic rules. Despite the continuation of barriers to intraregional trade, however, no non-
compliance suits have actually been filed by the secretariat or member states, and no national
judges have referred cases to the Court.143 Part IV returns to this issue, delving further into
the puzzle of why the Court’s adjudicatory role in economic disputes remains virtually non-
existent.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE ECOWASCOURT’S HUMANRIGHTS AUTHORITY
In its eight years of operation as a human rights court, the ECOWASCourt has survived sev-
eral political controversies and challenges. The first challenge stemmed from theCourt’s inter-
vention in a contested Nigerian election—which triggered protests fromNigerian politicians,
judges, and lawyers. A second, more serious threat involved an effort by the Gambia to curtail
the Court’s jurisdiction in response to decisions finding that state responsible for the torture
of journalists. As we explain, the ECOWAS Court emerged from these two events largely
unscathed and arguably strengthened. The third challenge, which is ongoing, focuses on
improving member state compliance with the Court’s judgments.
A Controversial Intervention in a Nigerian Election Dispute and the Creation of the ECOWAS
Judicial Council
When the ECOWAS Court began to hear cases under its new human rights jurisdiction,
somenational judges and attorneys expressed concern that theCourtwouldbecome embroiled
in domestic political disputes. These concerns came to a head in 2005—the first year of the
Court’s newmandate—when theCourt’s president issued a controversial ruling in an election
imbroglio involving a seat in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives.
Jerry Ugokwe had been declared the winner of the election by the Independent National
Electoral Commission. A Nigerian Elections Tribunal reversed the commission, finding that
Ugokwewas ineligible to run for the seat.TheNigerianFederalAppealsCourt—thefinal court
of review for all election disputes in Nigeria—upheld Ugokwe’s disqualification.144 Dissatis-
fiedwith this outcome,Ugokwefiled a complaintwith the ECOWASCourt alleging a violation
of his right to a fair hearing.145 Ugokwe asked the Court to issue a special interim order to
140 Id., Art. 4 (inserting Article 10(a) & (b) into the 1991 Protocol).
141 Id. (inserting Article 10(c) into the 1991 Protocol).
142 Id. (inserting Article 10(f ) into the 1991 Protocol).
143 Anene-Maidoh, supra note 113, at 9–10 (stating that the “concept of Preliminary Ruling as practiced by the
[ECJ] is yet to take root in the context of regional integration in Africa”).
144 Lillian Okenwa, Election Petition: ECOWAS Court Stops Ugokwe’s Successor, THIS DAY (Nigeria) ( June 2,
2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200506030463.html.
145 Iheanacho Nwosu, West Africa: I Am at ECOWAS Court to Get Fair Hearing—Hon. Ugokwe, DAILY
CHAMPION (Nigeria) ( June 21, 2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200506210089.html.
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prevent the Nigerian government from invalidating his election victory or from seating his
opponent.146 President Donli issued the interim order barring the legislature from swearing
in Okeke while Ugokwe’s complaint was pending.147 Nigeria promptly sought to dismiss the
suit for lack of jurisdiction, accusing Ugokwe of “forum shopping with courts.”148 President
Donli responded by renewing the interim order prior to leaving for a recess.149 These
were audacious acts, but Donli publicly defended them as necessary, temporary measures to
preserve the existence of a justiciable controversy until the judges could review Ugokwe’s alle-
gations.150
Notwithstanding concerns over the orders’ validity, Nigerian officials complied with the
Court’s interim directive. The attorney general and minister of justice issued a request to the
speaker of the House of Representatives “not to swear [Okeke] in until the case is fully settled
by the [ECOWASCourt].”151 The request created a political uproar that spilled onto the front
pages of the country’s newspapers. Politicians, judges, and lawyers focused on a provision of
theNigerianConstitution that designates election disputes as exclusively domesticmatters.152
They argued that this clause deprived the ECOWAS Court of jurisdiction to hear the election
disputes.153
After returning from a month-long recess, the judges dramatically reversed course and dis-
missed the suit. They reasoned that “no provision, whether general or specific, gives the Court
powers to adjudicate on electoral issues or matters arising thereof.”154 They also asserted that
the ECOWAS Court “is not a Court of Appeal or a Court of cassation” over domestic courts.
The judges thus declared themselves without authority to intervene “against the execution of
the Judgment already made by the Federal Appeal Court of the Member State of Nigeria.”155
The judges did not explain the about-face from the preliminary order, but the categorical
nature of the decision suggests that they wanted to send a clear message that they would not
intervene in future election disputes.
The Court’s dramatic change of position did little, however, to quell the underlying legal
and political controversy. As one Community official observed, “national high courts were
146 Specifically, Ugokwe requested a “special interim order” enjoining (1) the INEC from (a) invalidating Ugo-
kwe’s electionor (b) “tak[ing] any steps” towardhis replacement, and (2) theFederalNationalAssembly fromreliev-
ingUgokwe of his seat. Ugokwe v.Nigeria, CaseNo. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05, Judgment, paras. 7, 14.2–.3 (Oct. 7,
2005), reprinted in 2004–09 COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT 37 (2011).
147 Okenwa, supra note 144.
148 FG Asks ECOWAS Court to Dismiss Ugokwe Suit, VANGUARD (Nigeria) ( June 17, 2005), at http://all
africa.com/stories/200506170727.html.
149 Ise-Olu-Oluwa Ige, ECOWAS Court Goes on Recess, VANGUARD (Nigeria) ( July 7, 2005), at http://all
africa.com/stories/200507070032.html.
150 Okenwa, supra note 144.
151 Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 146, para. 10.
152 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Art. 246(3), 1999, at http://www.nigeria-law.org/
ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm#CourtOfAppeal.
153 Ige, supra note 149; Okenwa, supra note 144. The individuals whom we interviewed repeated these argu-
ments. Telephone interview with Academic A ( Jan. 6, 2011); Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra
note 92; Interviewwith ECOWASLegal AffairsDirectorate A, supra note 62; Interviewwith ECOWASLegal Affairs
Directorate B, supra note 98.
154 Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 146, para. 19.
155 Id., paras. 32, 33.
2013] 759A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST AFRICA
upset that [ECOWAS] judges with less qualifications and experience than they had could issue
rulings that would be final and binding on them.”156 The Ugokwe case exacerbated these
anxieties by putting the ECOWAS Court in direct conflict with the Nigerian judiciary and
political establishment.
Themember states responded to these concerns by creating a newECOWAS institution that
appears to have enhanced the Court’s independence and authority. In 2006, as part of a wider
overhaul of theCommunity,157 themember states created a JudicialCouncil158 “to ensure that
the Court is endowed with the best qualified and competent persons to contribute . . . to the
establishment of Community laws capable of consolidating and accelerating the regional inte-
gration process.”159 The council comprises the chief justices frommember states not then rep-
resented on the seven-member Court.160
The Judicial Council increases the influence of national judges in the selection process
for the ECOWAS Court, and it creates misconduct review procedures that insulate judges
from attempts by governments to remove them from office. ECOWAS judges are “statutory
appointments”—high-level positions that rotate among the member states. West African
governments collectively decide which country is next in line for a statutory appointment
to the Court. The Legal Affairs Directorate then advertises for the position and collects
submissions from eligible applicants. Applications that meet specified criteria are forwarded
to the Judicial Council, which vets applications and interviews candidates. The council
then selects three candidates and forwards their names, together with point-based rankings, to
the ECOWAS Authority, which decides which candidate to appoint to the Court. For sitting
judges, the Council is tasked with reviewing complaints alleging judicial bias and other forms
ofmalfeasance, providing a layer of political insulation forECOWAS judges againstwhomsuch
charges are filed.161
Also included in the Judicial Council reforms was a revision of the tenure of ECOWAS
judges—fromafive-year termwith the possibility of one reappointment to a single, nonrenew-
able four-year term.162 Secretariat officials explained this reform as a way to bring judicial
appointments to the Court in line with other statutory appointments in the Community.
Although the shortening of terms may seem like a rebuke of the ECOWAS Court, no one we
interviewed characterized the change in this way. Rather, they noted that shorter, nonrenew-
156 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; see also Donald Andoor,
Nigeria: Ugokwe Loses House Seat, THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Sept. 22, 2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/
200509230288.html.
157 ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, no. 1, Oct. 2006 (describing institutional changes), at http://www.ecowas.int/
publications/en/newsletter/ECOWAS_NewsLetter_01-Eng.pdf.
158 Decision A/Dec.2/06/06 Establishing the Judicial Council of the Community (adopted June 14, 2006) (on
file with authors).
159 ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, supra note 157, at 4.
160 Decision A/Dec.2/06/06, supra note 158, Arts. 1, 2.
161 Regulation C/Reg.23/12/07, Adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Community–Judicial Council, Art. 5,
Dec. 14–15, 2007 (on file with authors). The dismissal of judges for politically unpopular rulings has been a sig-
nificant concern in the East African Community legal system. James T. Gathii,Mission Creep or a Search for Rel-
evance:TheEast AfricanCourt of Justice’sHumanRights Strategy, 24DUKE J.COMP.&INT’LL. (forthcoming2014)
(manuscript at 24–25) (on file with authors).
162 This reform amends Article 4 of the 1991 Protocol. See ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, supra note 157, at 4.
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able terms would increase the opportunity of all ECOWASmember states to appoint judges to
the Court.163
The Judicial Council and tenure reforms have been favorably received by stakeholders.
As one lawyer noted, “Now that the Judicial Council exists, the stature of the Court will be
higher, which will improve the quality of judges [since] more qualified candidates will
apply.”164 The process is still relatively new, however, and only one set of appointments has
been made using the new procedures: in 2008, the ECOWAS Authority approved the slate of
judges recommended by the council.165 In addition, some concerns over judicial qualifications
persist—in particular, the absence of a requirement that judges be well versed in international
human rights law.166
The Gambia’s Proposal to Restrict the ECOWAS Court’s Human Rights Jurisdiction
The next political flashpoint for the ECOWAS Court concerned two decisions against
theGambia—both finding that state responsible for the disappearance and torture of journal-
ists—thatwerewidely viewed as legally sound, albeit politically audacious.Unable to challenge
the judgments as poorly reasoned or as an improper interference with domestic authority,
the Gambia launched a campaign in 2009 to narrow the Court’s human rights jurisdiction.
The case of Chief EbrimaManneh involved a reporter for theDaily Observerwho disclosed
information that appeared in a news article critical of the government.167 Plainclothes intel-
ligence agents arrestedManneh in July 2006.Hedisappeareduntil January2007,when reports
emerged that he was being detained at a local police station. Intelligence and police officials
denied that he was in their custody.168 In May 2007, the NGOMedia Foundation for West
Africa filed a complaintwith the ECOWASCourt charging theGambiawith numerous human
rights abuses, demanding Manneh’s release, and requesting compensation for his injuries.169
The Gambia refused to respond to the complaint and ignored multiple requests to appear or
163 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62. Other studies have found that interna-
tional judges who are ineligible for reappointment are more likely to rule against the governments that appointed
them. Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights,
102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 427 (2008).
164 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
165 African Press Organization, ECOWAS Council of Ministers Seeks Regional Infrastructural Development
(Nov. 30, 2008) (reporting results of a 2008 meeting of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers at which the “Council
. . . endorsed the report of the ECOWAS Judicial Council on the appointment of three new judges” for the
Court), at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2008/11/30/burkina-faso-ecowas-council-of-ministers-seeks-regional-
infrastructural-development/; Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, supra note 98.
166 Solomon T. Ebobrah, A Critical Analysis of the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice 47 n.194 (2008) (noting statement by ECOWAS Court vice president that “the human rights competence
of prospective appointees should be taken into consideration” even though such competence is not expressly stated
as a criterion for appointment), at http://www.humanrights.dk/files/doc/forskning/Research%20partnership%20
programme%20publications/S.Ebobrah.pdf.
167 IPI Calls on the Gambian Government to Cooperate with ECOWAS Legal Proceedings, FREEDOMNEWSPAPER
(Mar. 13, 2008), at http://www.freemedia.at/press-room/public-statements/press-releases/singleview/article/ipi-
calls-on-the-gambian-government-to-cooperate-with-ecowas-legal-proceedings.html.
168 Manneh v. The Gambia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07, Judgment, paras. 7–8 ( June 5, 2008), reprinted
in 2004–09 COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT 181 (2011), available at http://
www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-institution/ecowas-ccj.html.
169 Id., para. 3.
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file documents, delaying the proceedings.170 In June 2008, theCourt ruled forManneh, order-
ing the Gambia to release him from “unlawful detention without any further delay,” pay him
U.S.$100,000 in damages, and bear the costs of the litigation.171
The Gambia ignored the judgment—a decision that received a great deal of unfavorable
publicity from governments, international organizations, and NGOs.172 For example, the
International Press Institute publicly stated that the “Gambian media environment has long
been hostile and dangerous, but the government’s flagrant disregard for the ECOWAS legal
proceedings represents a low point.”173 Likewise, the African Commission on Human Rights
called on the Gambia “to immediately and fully comply” with the ECOWAS Court’s judg-
ment.174
The second case, concerning the detention and torture of Musa Saidykhan, was harder for
the government to ignore, because the plaintiff was alive, exhibited clear evidence of torture,
and pursued the case from the safety of another country.175 After a coup attempt in 2006, the
Independent newspaper published the names of individuals that the Gambian National Intel-
ligence Agency had arrested. Shortly thereafter and without a warrant, soldiers and policemen
arrested Saidykhan, the newspaper’s editor.176 Security agents took Saidykhan to a detention
center, where hewas held for twenty-two days and repeatedly tortured.177 Intelligence officials
eventually released Saidykhan, but they continued to monitor his movements and threatened
his family, ultimately causing Saidykhan and his family to flee the country.178
In 2007, Saidykhan, supported by theMedia Foundation forWest Africa, filed a complaint
with the ECOWAS Court seeking a declaration that his arrest and detention were illegal and
that he had been tortured and denied a fair hearing.179 This time, the Gambia participated in
the proceedings. It asked the ECOWASCourt to dismiss the suit on the grounds that theCourt
lacked jurisdiction, that theCourt’s interventionwas “an affront to [its] sovereignty,” and that
the suit should be heard by a national court.180 In 2009, the Court issued an interim ruling
rejecting these arguments.181
The Gambia’s political attack on the ECOWAS Court occurred while the merits phase of
Saidykhan was pending. Gambian officials noted that the government was “aggrieved” by the
170 Id., paras. 4, 28.
171 Id., para. 44.
172 E.g., U.S. Senators Call for Release of Journalist, FOROYAA NEWSPAPER (Serrekunda) (Apr. 28, 2009),
at http://business.highbeam.com/437649/article-1G1-198772071/us-senators-call-release-journalist; Durbin,
Other Senators Press Commonwealth Nations on Case of Missing Journalist, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 18, 2010
(on file with authors), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-221599405.html.
173 International Press Institute, IPI Calls on the Gambian Government to Cooperate with ECOWAS Legal Proceed-
ings, SENEGAMBIA NEWS (Mar. 13, 2008), at http://www.freemedia.at/archives/singleview/article/ipi-calls-on-
the-gambian-government-to-cooperate-with-ecowas-legal-proceedings.html.
174 LindaAkrasiKotey,Ghana:AkotoAmpaw,TwoOthers inGambia,GHANAIANCHRONICLE ( July17, 2009),
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200907171086.html.
175 ECOWAS Torture Case Against the Gambia Nears an End, AFROL NEWS (Sept. 22, 2010), at http://www.
afrol.com/articles/36623.
176 Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Ruling, supra note 110, para. 4.
177 Id., para. 7.
178 Id., paras. 8–9.
179 Id., para. 2.
180 Id., para. 11.
181 Id., para. 37.
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judgment in theManneh case and had “set the political process in motion to take the matter
to the next level and get the decision set aside.”182 In September 2009, the Gambia called for
aMeeting of Government Experts to revise the 2005 Protocol and restrict the Court’s author-
ity.183Most importantly, theGambia sought to limit theECOWASCourt’s human rights juris-
diction to treaties ratified by the respondent state and to require exhaustion of domestic
remedies.184
On their face, these proposals seem uncontroversial. As noted above, other international
human rights tribunals operate under similar limitations. According to a consortium of
NGOs, however, the “Gambian government propose[d] these amendments so that the Court
will be weakened in its capacity to deal effectively with tyrannical governments trampling on
citizens’ rights.” In theNGOs’ view, theproposal to require exhaustionof local remedies aimed
to “depriv[e] citizens of free access” to an “independent judicial instrument that is not usually
available in many countries” in a region “where the judiciary is an arm of the executive.” And
the attempt to limit the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction to ratified human rights treaties was a
ploy “to prevent the Court from adjudicating on the [Saidykhan] case against TheGambia”—
“one of the rare African countries which has not ratified” the UN Convention Against Tor-
ture.185
The ECOWAS Commission (which, under the 2006 reorganization mentioned above,
replaced the Executive Secretariat) responded to the Gambian proposals by invoking the pro-
cedures for public participation in ECOWAS decision making. The commission also invited
WestAfrican lawyers to consider theproposed,multipart amendment.186Basedon their input,
the ECOWAS Committee of Legal Experts recommended against narrowing the Court’s
human rights jurisdiction. In October 2009, the Council of Justice Ministers unanimously
endorsed the committee’s recommendation—with the consequence that the proposals were
implicitly rejected at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers the following month.187
TheGambia’s proposals provided a clear opportunity for ECOWASmember states to recon-
sider the2005Protocol.Their decision to reject theGambian challenge is striking. Inour inter-
views, officials offered different explanations for this decision. One source explained that gov-
ernments did not want to reward the Gambia for its poor human rights record. These
182 Gambian Attorney-General Denies Holding Missing Journalist, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 7, 2009.
183 West Africa: Country Submits Proposals to Amend ECOWAS Protocol, FOROYAA NEWSPAPER (Serrekunda)
(Sept. 25, 2009), athttp://allafrica.com/stories/200909250810.html; see alsoNanaAduAmpofo,GambianAuthor-
ities Seek to Limit Reach of Regional Human Rights Court, GLOBAL INSIGHT (Sept. 28, 2009) (on file with authors);
InnocentAnaba, SERAP, CHRDAChallenge Plans to AmendECOWAS’Court Powers, VANGUARD (Nigeria), June 26,
2008 (on file with authors).
184 The Gambia also proposed that cases should be admissible for only twelve months after the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, that applicants should not be anonymous, and that complaints submitted to the ECOWAS
Court should be barred from later being filed with other international courts. The Gambia reiterated the need for
a process to appeal all ECOWASCourt decisions.West Africa: Country Submits Proposals to AmendECOWASProtocol,
supra note 183.
185 Four IFEX Members, Civil Society Groups Fear Gambia Proposal Will Prevent ECOWAS Court from Ruling
in Saidykhan Case, IFEX (Sept. 28, 2009), at http://www.ifex.org/west_africa/2009/09/28/ecowas_court_
jurisdiction/.
186 Id.; Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
187 Justice Ministers Endorse Experts’ Decision on ECOWAS Jurisdiction, IFEX, (Oct. 14, 2009), at http://
www.ifex.org/west_africa/2009/10/14/gambian_proposal_defeated/. One source told us that, while the justice
ministers unanimously rejected theGambia’s proposals, the foreignministers were split, with one-third supporting
and two-thirds opposing the proposals. Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate A, supra note 91.
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governments recognized thatGambian officials were acting in a blatantly “self-interestedway”
by attempting to circumvent the Court’s review of serious and widely known human rights
abuses.188 Also important were themobilization efforts of human rightsNGOs and attorneys,
who made sure that the issues were well covered in the press. One interviewee even suggested
that ECOWAS officials had a hand in opposing theGambian proposals by leaking information
to human rights lawyers.189
In December 2010, the ECOWAS Court issued a judgment holding the Gambia respon-
sible for the illegal detention and torture of Saidykhan and ordering the state to pay him
U.S.$200,000 in damages.190 The Gambia has refused to comply, however, with either the
Saidykhan or the Manneh judgments. In 2011, in addition to denying responsibility for
Manneh’s death,191 the Gambia asked the Court to set aside both judgments, and attacked
Saidykhan as a “miscarriage of justice since the court failed to properly appraise the evidence
on record.” The Media Foundation for West Africa opposed the application and reiterated
its demands for compliance.192 In 2012, the judges rejected the Gambia’s arguments and reaf-
firmed the two judgments and remedial orders.193
Although the Gambia continues to resist the ECOWAS Court’s authority, the defeat of its
judicial reformcampaignhas had the opposite of its intended effect: it has bolstered theCourt’s
legitimacy. As previously explained, the 2005 Protocol entered into force provisionally pend-
ing ratification by individual member states, a process that is still ongoing. In 2006, however,
West African governments restructured ECOWAS rulemaking to increase its supranational
character. The reforms authorize the Authority to adopt “supplementary acts.” These legal
instruments are equivalent to protocols but with one crucial difference—they are “binding on
Member States and the institutions of the Community” without the need for country-by-
country ratification.194
The effect of these reformsonpreviously adoptedprotocols is unclear.One attorneyworried
that the continuation of the 2005 Protocol’s provisional status remains a potential “liability”
for the ECOWAS Court.195 Even if this interpretation is correct as a legal matter, those whom
188 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62.
189 Interviews withHuman Rights Advocates B, supra note 48, C, supra note 92; Interview with ECOWAS Legal
Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; see also Four IFEX Members, Civil Society Groups Fear Gambia Proposal Will
Prevent ECOWAS Court from Ruling in Saidykhan Case, supra note 185 (listing regional civil society groups that
mobilized against the Gambia’s proposals).
190 Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07, Judgment, para. 47 (Dec. 16. 2010);
see alsoOusman Njie, ECOWAS Court Awards Musa Saidykhan $200,000, FOROYAA NEWSPAPER (Serrekunda)
(Dec. 17, 2010), at http://www.foroyaa.gm/international-news/7445-gambia-news-archive.
191 In 2011, the country’s president suggested that Manneh had died but that “the government has nothing
to do with” his death. Critical Activists and Journalists Detained Under “Bogus Charges,” IFEX ( July 27, 2011), at
http://www.ifex.org/the_gambia/2011/07/27/bogus_charges/.
192 Media Foundation for West Africa, Alerts and Updates 2011: ECOWAS Court Adjourns Hearing on Gambian
Government Request for Review of Two Landmark Judgements (Dec. 29, 2011), at http://www.mediafound.org/?
p!3188.
193 Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07, Application for Review (Feb. 7, 2012); see
Gambia: ECOWAS Court Rules in Favour of Musa Saidykhan, FOROYAA NEWSPAPER (Serrekunda) (Feb. 11,
2012), at http://allafrica.com/stories/201202140302.html.
194 ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, supra note 157, at 2.
195 Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate A, supra note 91.
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we interviewed all agreed that the rejection of theGambia’s proposalsmade the Protocol’s pro-
visional status a non-issue politically.196 Having survived this attempt to curb its jurisdiction,
theCourt’s human rights authority now rests on amore solid foundation thanwhen themem-
ber states first gave the Court that authority in 2005.
Strategies to Promote Compliance: Strict Proof Requirements, Limited Remedies, and Public
Outreach
Since the expansionof its jurisdiction in 2005, theECOWASCourt has issuednearly seventy
merits judgments, the large majority of which concern human rights.197 Many of these deci-
sions are legally and politically consequential. In a well-publicized early case, ECOWAS judges
found Niger liable for condoning a customary practice of female slavery.198 More recently,
the Court issued a pathbreaking judgment againstNigeria for failing to regulatemultinational
oil companies that polluted the Niger Delta.199 Other high-profile decisions have barred the
domestic prosecution of former Chadian president Hissein Habre´ as contrary to the non-
retroactivity of criminal law;200 ordered the restoration of funds embezzled from a program to
provide free basic education to children;201 granted NGOs standing to challenge violations of
economic and social rights;202 and awarded damages to individuals arbitrarily detained by
police and security officials.203
These decisions grab headlines, and they significantly enhance the Court’s salience and vis-
ibility across West Africa.204 It is less clear, however, whether these decisions have improved
respect for human rights in the region.205 According to a 2013 paper by the Court’s chief reg-
196 Interview ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; Interview with Human Rights Advocate C,
supra note 92; Interview with ECOWAS Court Official C, supra note 137.
197 As of July 2013, the ECOWASCourt’s decisions included seventeen rulings and sixty-seven judgments on the
merits. Amie Sanneh,West Africa: ECOWAS Court of Justice Brief the Press, FOROYAANEWSPAPER (Serrekunda)
( July 26, 2013) (reporting statement of the ECOWAS Court chief registrar), at http://allafrica.com.
proxy.lib.duke.edu/stories/201307291277.html. Solomon Ebobrah has provided the most detailed analysis of the
ECOWAS Court’s human rights jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ebobrah, Critical Issues, supra note 112.
198 Hadijatou Mani Kouraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122.
199 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Judgment
(Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter SERAP Niger Delta Judgment].
200 Habre´ v. Senegal, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/08, Judgment (Nov. 18, 2010).
201 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, Judgment
(Nov. 30, 2010) [hereinafter SERAP Basic Education Judgment].
202 SERAP Basic Education Ruling, supra note 109.
203 E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 114; Tandja v. Niger, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/10,
Judgment (Nov. 8, 2010).
204 One indication of this salience is the increasing discussion of ECOWASCourt cases in theWest African news
media. A search for “ECOWAS Court” and “Community Court of Justice” on AllAfrica.com—a news aggregator
Web service—yielded the following number of “hits” each year:
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
6 4 2 12 50 28 47 61 53 67 79 90
205 Article 15(4) of the 1993Treaty, supranote 37, provides that the ECOWASCourt’s judgments “shall be bind-
ing on theMember States, the Institutions of theCommunity and on individuals and corporate bodies,” andArticle
19(2) of Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on theCommunityCourt of Justice, supranote 61,makes theCourt’s decisions “final
and immediately enforceable.” As with other international courts, however, the ECOWASCourt does “not have the
benefit of institutions with powers of coercion to enforce [its] judgments” and has to rely on “pressure generated
2013] 765A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST AFRICA
istrar, “not many decisions of the Court have been enforced.”206 Perhaps aware of the chal-
lenges of inducing governments to comply with its judgments, the Court has tempered the
legal and political impact of its decisions by requiring applicants to provide persuasive proof
that the relevant human rights norms are widely accepted and by limiting the remedies that it
demands of governments.
Complainants have raised a wide array of legal issues before the ECOWASCourt. Some alle-
gations relate to human rights only tangentially; others seek expansive interpretations of estab-
lished rights; still others allege multiple violations but offer few supporting facts. The Court
has responded to these diverse complaints by adopting fairly strict pleading and proof require-
ments. Applicants must “specify the particular human right which has been violated”207 and
provide evidence that is “sufficiently convincing and unequivocal.”208 ECOWAS judges have
also rejected litigants’ attempts to assert human rights claims against individuals, corporations,
and subnational political bodies209—issues that have also been litigated in theUnitedStates.210
The judges’ circumspectionwith regard to remedies is alsonoteworthy. In themodern forms
of slavery case, for example, the Court ordered Niger to pay the equivalent of U.S.$20,000 to
a woman who had been enslaved.211 The government paid the damages within three months,
and,while not formally required todo so, prosecutedher formermaster.212 Yet theCourtmade
compliance fairly easy forNiger by refusing the applicant’s entreaties tofind faultwith the laws,
practices, and customs that gave rise to the modern slavery violations in the first instance.213
Other high-profile decisions exhibit similar remedial caution. In the Nigerian education
case, the ECOWASCourt declared that “everyNigerian child is entitled to free and compulsory
basic education.”214 Yet it did not order the government to allocate whatever funds were
required to educate all primary school age children. Instead, based on evidence that specific
funds had been embezzled from the national education program, the Court ordered Nigeria
to “take the necessary steps to provide the money to cover the shortfall” while the government
pursued efforts “to recover the funds or prosecute the suspects.”215
by the political arms of [theCommunity], the indulgence of national executives or the goodwill of national courts.”
Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 96.
206 Anene-Maidoh, supra note 113, at 27.
207 Keita v. Mali, Judgment, supra note 114, para. 33.
208 Garba v. Benin, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/09/08, Judgment, para. 39 (Feb. 17, 2010). The Court recently
reaffirmed this evidentiary standard and extended it to defenses raised by states. Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra
note 114, paras. 48–50.
209 See, e.g., David v. Uwechue, Ruling, supra note 121, para. 48 (individuals); Hassan v. Nigeria, Case
No. ECW/CCJ/APP/03/10, Judgment, para. 41 (Mar. 15, 2012) (subnational political entities and their officials);
SERAP Niger Delta Ruling, supra note 109, paras. 69–71 (corporations).
210 E.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (Alien Tort Statute does not apply to
human rights violations by foreign corporations committed on the territory of another state); Mohamad v. Pales-
tinian Authority, 132 S.Ct. 1702 (2012) (only individuals, not corporate entities, can be liable under the Torture
Victim Protection Act); Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (foreign official sued for conduct undertaken in
his official capacity is not a “foreign state” entitled to immunity from suit).
211 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122, para. 92.
212 HelenDuffy,HumanRights Cases in Sub-regional AfricanCourts: Towards Justice forVictims or JustMore Frag-
mentation, in THE DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 163,
179–81 (Larissa van den Herik & Carsten Stahn eds., 2012).
213 ALTER, supra note 8, at 264–66.
214 SERAP Basic Education Judgment, supra note 201, para. 26.
215 Id., para. 28.
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The judges took a different tack in a judgment touching the “third rail” of Nigerian pol-
itics—the activities ofmultinational oil companies in theNigerDelta.TheCourt declared that
Nigeriawas responsible for failing to regulate companies that haddespoiled the area. It rejected
a demand, however, for U.S.$1 billion in damages on the ground that the applicants had not
identified particular victims and that awarding mass damages would be impractical “in terms
of justice, morality and equity.”216 The judges instead ordered Nigeria to “take all measures”
to restore the environment, prevent future damage, and hold the perpetrators accountable—
without, however, specifying how the government was to achieve these goals.217
Strict proof requirements and limited remedies may be strategically wise choices for a
young human rights court whose judgments have yet to elicit widespread compliance. A
2012 NGO report supports this conclusion. In addition to full compliance in the Hadijatou
Mani Koraou slavery case against Niger, the report lists a few instances of partial com-
pliance,218 including the Habre´ decision against Senegal, the release of the former president
of Niger from house arrest, and the payment of damages to members of the Togolese Par-
liamentwrongfully removed fromoffice.219Other judgments, including the high-profile deci-
sions against Nigeria and the Gambia discussed above, have yet to garner even partial com-
pliance.220
ECOWAS judges readily admit these compliance challenges. In 2012, the current ECOWAS
Court president, Awa Nana Daboya, publicly “decried the attitude of the Nigerian govern-
ment for not honoring any of” the tenmerits judgments that the Court had issued against that
country.221 At the same time, theCourt has praised those countries—includingNigeria—that
have designated a public ministry to oversee the implementation of its judgments. And it has
discussed ways to promote compliance in meetings with government officials and national
judges.222 Civil society groups have added their voices to these efforts, issuing public declara-
tions demanding that states comply with ECOWAS Court decisions and urging Community
officials to step up enforcement efforts.223 A few political leaders have also expressed support
216 SERAP Niger Delta Judgment, supra note 199, paras. 113–15.
217 Id., para. 121.
218 Recent studies suggest that partial compliance is the norm for human rights tribunals. See, e.g.,DarrenHawk-
ins andWade Jacoby,Partial Compliance: AComparison of the European and Inter-AmericanCourt ofHumanRights,
6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35, 56–83 (2010); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-
American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 509–29 (2011).
219 Horace Adjolohoun, Status of Human Rights Judgments of the ECOWAS Court: Implications on Human Rights
and Democracy in the Region (Aug. 7, 2012) (on file with authors).
220 Id.
221 Eyo Charles, West Africa: Nigeria Doesn’t Respect Our Rulings—ECOWAS Court, DAILY TRUST (Mar. 13,
2012), at http://allafrica.com/stories/201203130408.html.
222 E.g., Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS, Summary of Activities for the Year 2011, at 5 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/annual_reports/activities_report_2011.pdf; Press Release,
Media Foundation for West Africa, MFWA Holds Forum on ECOWAS Court in Abuja ( July 27, 2012), at
http://www.mediafound.org/index.php?option!com_content&task!view&id!857.
223 Bassey Udo, West Africa: Human Rights Groups Want Mechanism to Enforce ECOWAS Court Decisions,
PREMIUM TIMES (Nigeria) (May 2, 2013), at http://allafrica.com/stories/201305020992.html; Media Founda-
tion for West Africa Abuja Declaration of the Regional Civil Society Forum on the Enforcement of Judgements of the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice ( July 30, 2012), at http://www.mediafound.org/en/?p!3073; Press Release,
Media Foundation for West Africa, ECOWAS Commission Commits to Ensuring Member States Comply with
Decisions of the Community Court of Justice (Nov. 15, 2012) (on file with authors).
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for compliance in specific cases, even when the government as a whole remains noncommit-
tal.224
Pressure for compliance also comes fromoutside ECOWAS. For example, the disappearance
of Chief EbrimaManneh, the applicant in the 2008 unlawful detention case discussed above,
was raised in 2010during theUniversal PeriodicReviewof theGambia before theUNHuman
RightsCouncil.225Recent human rights reports by theUnited States and theUnitedKingdom
also highlight the Gambia’s continued noncompliance with the ECOWAS Court’s judg-
ments.226
In sum, although the ECOWAS Court is still a young international tribunal with an uncer-
tain future, theCourthas survived twomajor challenges to the exercise its human rights author-
ity, arguably emerging stronger for having weathered those travails. The judges are also aware
of ongoing concerns about noncompliance and are responding both in their jurisprudence and
in actions outside the courtroom. Finally, as we discuss below in our conclusion, the ECOWAS
Court’s status as a human rights court is far more settled than that of subregional community
courts elsewhere in Africa.
IV. EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ECOWASCOURT’S REDEPLOYMENT AS AHUMANRIGHTS COURT
This part considers the theoretical implications of the ECOWASCourt’s redeployment.The
broad delegation of human rights authority to the ECOWASCourt is likely to elicit incredulity
from those who expect African leaders to be jealous of their sovereignty and to tightly control
the international institutions that they create.This expectation is reflected in rational function-
alist international relations theory, which assumes that states delegate authority to interna-
tional institutions only when doing so furthers narrowly conceived functional objectives. We
agree that state interests and sovereignty matter, and that the creation of a far-reaching and
domestically intrusive international human rights reviewmechanism inWest Africa is surpris-
ing. We are not, however, surprised that an international institution created to achieve one
objective evolved to take on very different functions or that such an institution developed in
a way that constrains the discretion of governments.
In the subsections that follow, we contrast rational functionalist theories with historical
institutionalist accounts, which recognize that institutions can evolve over time to become
quite different from what the founders first envisioned. We then return to part I’s discussion
of how the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s reoriented regional politics and ECOWAS
institutions inways that opened a door forNGOs,Community officials, and judges to expand
224 E.g., Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, Senate President Wants Action on ECOWAS Right to
Education Judgment (n.d.) (stating that the head of theNigerian Senatewas the “first political leader to acknowledge
the [SERAPBasicEducation Judgment] and to take action towards its implementation”),athttp://serap-nigeria.org/
senate-president-wants-action-on-ecowas-right-to-education-judgment/.
225 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Gambia,
UN Doc. A/HRC/14/6, at 4, 21 (Mar. 24, 2010), at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/
125/20/PDF/G1012520.pdf?OpenElement.
226 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012:
THE GAMBIA, at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year!2012&dlid!204123;
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 2012, at http://www.hrd
report.fco.gov.uk/.
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the ECOWAS Court’s mandate. Finally, we address the puzzle of how the court reform cam-
paign—triggered by a desire to increase judicial enforcement of ECOWAS economic rules—
ended up as a delegation of expansive human rights authority.
Mechanisms of Change in International Institutions
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the increasing number and influence of interna-
tional institutions called into question the long-standing claim of realist scholars that states
pursue their national interests above all else. Seeking to explain these developments, scholars
spawned an extensive literature that merges rational choice institutional analysis, functional
analysis, and realist assumptions about state behavior. This literature proceeds from the prem-
ise that international institutions and regimes are primarily either mechanisms for states to
coordinate to achieve joint gains or vehicles for powerful nations to influence the behavior of
weaker states.227
These rationalist approaches assume that the design of international institutions is shaped
by functional goals, such as addressing the structural features of underlying cooperation prob-
lems while accommodating diverse state capabilities and interests.228 These approaches also
identify themechanisms bywhich states control international institutions, including appoint-
ment processes, allocation of budgets, voting rules, political vetoes, and threats of noncom-
pliance. Although state control remains incomplete, governments are expected to oppose
activities that compromise important national interests.229
Rationalist scholars recognize that international institutions can change over time. In the
case of global terrorism, for example, a fundamental shift in thenature of the cooperationprob-
lem resulted inmodifications of institutional competences. Similarly, changes inmembership,
relative power, or state interests can lead to revisions of decision-making rules and other design
features, such as occurredwith the transformation from theGeneral Agreement onTariffs and
Trade into the World Trade Organization. In these and other instances, however, the under-
lying assumption is that international institutions remain closely tethered to the interests of
governments.
Historical institutionalist theory proceeds from different premises. The theory does not
assume that the primary goal of the actors who populate institutions is to meet government
demands. Instead,whenelections, economic crises, exogenous shocks, or policy failures change
state and societal preferences, institutions come under pressure to respond and evolve. Initial
227 This literature began with a 1982 special issue of the journal International Organization, which was later
republished as INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983). Similar assumptions underpin recent
rationalist international law scholarship. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (2008).
228 E.g., Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson&Duncan Snidal,The Rational Design of International Institutions,
55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001); Barbara Koremenos,When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW&
CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (2008).
229 DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake,
Daniel L. Nielson &Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of
International Delegation, 71 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008). For a criticism of this scholarship, see Karen J.
Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33 (2008).
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design choices and vested interests interact with shifts in the environment to produce path-
dependent change.230 These contestations and the adaptation that they engender are a normal
part of politics.
Contemporary historical institutionalist work focuses in depth on the modalities of insti-
tutional evolution. Early studies emphasized inertia and suggested that major policy reorien-
tations occur primarily during critical junctures—infrequent moments of political, social, or
economic upheaval when an unusual opening of political space enables the overturning of
entrenched ideas and approaches.231 Recent scholarship focuses on incremental shifts that
occur through political contestation and realignments of coalitions that support institutions.
These more gradual changes can cumulate into transformations that are as large as, or larger
than, the changes that occur during critical junctures.232
Two modalities of incremental change are especially relevant to the institutional transfor-
mations in ECOWAS. Change initially occurred via “layering”—the addition of rules, goals,
or priorities that over time can become defining features of the institution.233 We argue that
the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s expanded theCommunity’smandate and created
concomitantly greater constraints on state sovereignty due to expanding conceptions of
regional security. These incremental shifts, in turn, created a permissive environment for non-
state actors to convince states to give the ECOWAS Court a human rights jurisdiction. The
addition of private litigant access in human rights cases led to the Court’s “conversion” or
“redeployment,” a change that allowed new actors to redirect the institution toward new goals,
functions, and purposes.234
Layering: From Economic Integration to Regional Security, Good Governance, and
Human Rights
As we discussed in part I, although the founding goals of ECOWAS emphasized economic
integration anddevelopment,WestAfrican governments also created a limited security role for
theCommunity. The 1978Protocol ofNon-aggression pledgedmember states to refrain from
threats or use of force and from “encouraging or condoning acts of subversion” in neighboring
230 Wolfgang Streeck &Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, in
BEYONDCONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONALCHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 1, 7, 11 (Wolfgang
Streeck&Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005). Historical institutionalist approaches have a growing, but less well known,
foothold in international relations scholarship. See, e.g., Orfeo Fioretos,Historical Institutionalism in International
Relations, 65 INT’L ORG. 367 (2011); Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 666–69 (2006).
231 For foundational studies that examine critical junctures, see PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN
HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES (1986); BARRINGTON
MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN WORLD (1967); THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA AND CHINA (1979). For a recent discussion of how critical junctures contribute
to institutional change, see Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures in Historical
Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL. 341 (2007).
232 E.g., KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004); Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical
Institutionalist Perspective, 29 COMP. POL. STUD. 123 (1996).
233 Streeck & Thelen, supra note 230, at 22–24.
234 Id. at 26–29.
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countries,235 and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense promised a collective
response to foreign aggression.236 For more than a decade, these Protocols remained mostly
ornamental symbols of theCommunity’s postcolonial commitment to the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of its member states.237 In the early 1990s, however, Liberia’s civil war spilled
over into Sierra Leone, generating mass atrocities and refugee flows. In response, the member
states, led by Nigeria, invoked the dormant security protocols to justify military intervention
to quell the violence and prevent the spread of instability.
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were a watershed for ECOWAS in several
respects. First, the interventions were a sharp break from the norm of noninterference in inter-
nal affairs.238 The collective response to mass atrocities on the territory of one of their own,
despite vociferous protestations by some francophone member states, revealed that African
governments were willing to limit national sovereignty to achieve other Community goals.
Political leaders initially identified these goals as the immediate need to restore peace and secu-
rity in particular countries. Over time, however, the goals expanded to a broader conception
of regional conflict prevention that included constitutional transitions of power, good gover-
nance, and human rights. Court reform advocates stressed that this expansion “reoriented
thinking [in West Africa] about jurisdictional sovereignty.”239
Second, the interventions exposed gaps in ECOWAS legal instruments that created oppor-
tunities for a wider overhaul of the Community. The member states’ decision to put security
issues on a firmer legal footing occurred at the same time as the high-level review of the inte-
gration project and the decision to create the ECOWAS Court. The Committee of Eminent
Persons, convened in 1991 to assess the shortcomings of ECOWAS’s founding period and pro-
pose institutional reforms, gave equal emphasis to security and economic issues. The commit-
tee defined security broadly as including “peace and stability” within states, and it highlighted
that the “whirlwind of political reform sweeping through various parts of the world [has not]
exempted West Africa, where demands for democratisation, based on political pluralism and
respect for human rights, have multiplied in recent times.”240 Whereas the 1975 ECOWAS
Treaty “d[id] not mention human rights and completely avoid[ed] any use of human rights
language,”241 following the Committee’s recommendations the 1993 Revised Treaty identi-
fied the African Charter as a “fundamental principle” of ECOWAS.242 These revisions created
another facilitating condition for themember states’ later decision to give the ECOWASCourt
jurisdiction over human rights.
235 Supra note 40, Arts. 1, 2.
236 Supra note 41.
237 These protocols reflected the then prevalent idea of a Pax Africana, wherein African leaders would manage
their own internal affairs. COMFORTERO,WAHEGURUPAL SINGH SIDHU&AUGUSTINETOUREET (RAPPOR-
TEURS), TOWARD A PAX WEST AFRICANA: BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED SUB-REGION (2001), available
at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/pdf_report_pax_w__africana.pdf.
238 Comfort Ero, ECOMOG: A Model for Africa, in BUILDING STABILITY IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES FOR THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 97 ( Jakkie Cilliers & Annika Hildung-Norberg eds., 2000).
239 E.g., Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate A, supra note 91.
240 Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 37; see also VILJOEN, supra note 134, at 482 (“as the winds of democ-
racy swept authoritarianismandmilitarism from the continent in a post–ColdWarworld, . . . human rights became
mainstreamed into all forms of subregional cooperation”).
241 Ebobrah, Critical Issues, supra note 112, at 3.
242 1993 Treaty, supra note 37, Art. 4(g).
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Third, although the member states justified the interventions on humanitarian grounds,
ECOMOG forces sadly added to the humanitarian tragedy. The “numerous reports of
ECOMOG peacekeepers engag[ing] in looting, expropriation and theft” and accusations of
“human-rights abuses, and sexual exploitation of women and children . . . bespoke of the lack
of discipline and accountability of the armed forces of the countries involved, especially
Nigeria.”243 The abuses and subsequent lack of accountability highlighted that the Com-
munity had “not done enough to incorporate human rights in its conflict resolution ini-
tiative[s].”244 These events also triggered “a re-examination of the role of human rights in
guaranteeing regional stability and security in ECOWAS,”245 adding to the “demands for
democratisation, based on political pluralism and respect for human rights” from civil society
groups that now had input into Community decision making.246
Taken together, the layered-on addition of these broad security goals fundamentally shifted
ECOWAS’s normative orientation, a change exemplified by the 1999Conflict Prevention Pro-
tocol and the 2001GoodGovernance Protocol discussed in part II. This shift helps to explain
why the arguments of court reform advocates resonated with government and Community
officials, who saw advantages to fulfilling the pledge to give the ECOWAS Court “the power
to hear . . . cases relating to violations of human rights,”247 and to taking a concrete step toward
creating a more “people-centered” Community.248 Compared to authorizing collective mil-
itary intervention in a member state, empowering the Court to adjudicate individual human
rights violations was a relatively modest step.
Redeployment: Why Human Rights Have Eclipsed Economic Issues in the ECOWAS Court
The expansion of the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction to include human rights did not sup-
plant the Court’s original mandate to interpret and apply Community economic rules. Seen
from this perspective, the 2005 Protocol is an example of “layering”—the addition of a new
goal or priority to an existing institution that also retains its originalmandate. In practice, how-
ever, the ECOWAS Court functions primarily as an international human rights tribunal, and
its docket is bereft of cases challenging violations of Community economic rules. The Court’s
transformation is thusmore accurately viewed an example of “redeployment” or “conversion,”
a change that allows a new set of actors to fundamentally reorient an institution in a new
direction.
The absence of a practical role for the Court in enforcing regional economic rules does not
mean that member states have abandoned cooperation in that area. ECOWAS continues to
advertise its one-sentence mission as “promot[ing] economic integration in all fields of eco-
nomic activity,”249 and the Community has made meaningful policy steps toward this goal.
For example, the 2005 Protocol enhanced the Court’s role in overseeing compliance with
243 Arthur, supra note 45, at 16.
244 KABIA, supra note 43, at 87.
245 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, ECOWAS Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights, in COMPENDIUM OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “THE LAW IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA,”
supra note 93, at 185.
246 KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 161; see also id., at 49–50 (discussing NGO participation).
247 2001 Good Governance Protocol, supra note 49, Art. 39.
248 Interview with Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, supra note 91.
249 ECOWAS in Brief (n.d.), at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id!about_a&lang!en.
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ECOWAS economic rules by permitting preliminary references from national courts and
authorizing enforcement actions by the ECOWASCommission.250 In addition, since the 2006
overhaul of theCommunity, it can be argued persuasively that ECOWAS rules are nowdirectly
applicable in national legal orders, with the consequence that judges should, in theory, be able
to apply those rules directly.
But significant barriers to enforcing economic rules persist. As a formal matter, although
ECOWASprotocols are directly applicable, themember states have not created “legislative pro-
visions that ‘speak to’ the relations between [Community and domestic] legal systems.”251 In
addition, national judges and lawyers have little knowledge of how the ECOWAS legal system
is designed to function. Without formal rules or habituated practices, national judges are dis-
inclined to invalidate conflicting national laws or to refer cases to the ECOWAS Court.
Member statesmighthave reduced these barriers had the2005Protocol givenprivate traders
direct access to the ECOWAS Court. The absence of such access from the 2005 reforms is one
of themost puzzling aspects of the Court’s transformation. It is especially so in the wake of the
Afolabi case, which directly raised the issue of economic actors not having standing before the
Court.252
Explaining why access for private traders vanished from the court reform campaign requires
us to search for “dogs that did not bark,” an inquiry that is necessarily nomore than suggestive.
Our research reveals two plausible explanations for this omission: no regionally organized con-
stituency sought the vigorous enforcement of ECOWAS economic rules, and court reform
advocates strategically conflated human rights and economic freedoms and then sacrificed
direct access of one to achieve the other.
The first explanation is true but insufficient. Economic interest groups are present in
West Africa, and they are aware of the many obstacles to intraregional trade. We interviewed
the leadership of one of these groups, the National Association of Nigeria Traders (NANTs),
whose officials are knowledgeable about the ECOWAS legal system.253 They identified specific
practices inGhana andNigeria that violateCommunity economic rules, includingborder clos-
ings and impediments to establishing a business, and they showed us letters of complaint filed
with the ECOWAS Commission. To enhance their ability to challenge these violations,
NANTs recently asked West African governments to allow private firms direct access to the
Court.254
NANTs was not, however, part of the 2005 court reform campaign. One impediment
to its inclusion was that the group is nationally organized, whereas ECOWAS rules only allow
for participation by regional groups. But ECOWAS officials could have facilitated the mobi-
lization of economic groups, or national traders with a presence in multiple countries could
have organized regionally. Perhaps such groups did not see any benefit from using ECOWAS
institutions to promote their objectives. But then one has to ask why they would not adopt
a strategy that worked so well for human rights groups. Our answer is that West African
250 See the sub-subsection in part II entitled “A broad authority for human rights suits, but a narrower mandate
for economic cases” (explaining these provisions of the 2005 Protocol).
251 Ebobrah, Critical Issues, supra note 112, at 15.
252 See subsection in part II entitled “The Afolabi Case: Justice Denied for Private Litigants.”
253 The organization’s website is at http://nants.org/.
254 Crusoe Osagie, West Africa: Traders Task ECOWAS on Regional Integration, THIS DAY (Aug. 29, 2011),
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201108300754.html.
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governments benefit from maintaining barriers to intraregional trade and that these bene-
fits, at least in the current political and economic climate, outweigh the advantages of
achieving a functioning commonmarket. In the words of a recentNANTs newsletter, “Mem-
ber States did not desire the Court to be an engine for realizing the economic integration
objective.”255
Although economic groups did not gain direct access to the Court in the 2005 reforms,
human rights groups did, and they have since capitalized on this access by filing numerous suits
against governments. To convert the Court to their objective, these groups argued that the
Community’s recently endorsed goal of protecting human rights and its long-standing plan to
promote economic development were one and the same.ManyWest African scholars, NGOs,
and litigants strategically conflate the goals of economic integration and the protection of
human rights. For example, one such scholar, Nneoma Nwogu, points to provisions in the
1993 Treaty that embrace social values, including human rights, and argues that these values
are fundamental to the Community’s economic motivations.256 Our interviews revealed a
similar tendency to elide these objectives. A human rights attorney told us that ECOWAS was
created in response to problems, such as Nigeria’s expulsion of West Africans in the 1970s,
that implicated both economic and human rights issues.257 The applicant’s lawyer in the
Afolabi case also invoked both theAfricanCharter’s human right to freedomofmovement and
ECOWAS’s free-movement obligations, seemingly drawing on the growing human rights zeit-
geist to bolster Afolabi’s legal claim.258
Court reform advocates may have genuinely believed that human rights encompass eco-
nomic freedoms, but they also must have been aware that the two legal fields intersect only in
part. It is more likely that advocates strategically conflated the two fields to suggest that giving
the Court a human rights mandate would also further ECOWAS’s primary objective of pro-
moting regional integration.Governments and ECOWAS officials were seemingly happy to go
along with this diversion.
The strategy worked. But as theNANTs newsletter explains, the ability to file human rights
complaints with the ECOWAS Court does not help to challenge most economic violations,
such as a Ghanaian law that privileges domestic traders and requires significant cash invest-
ments for foreigners to establish abusiness.259 In reality, then, thedecision to grant direct access
only for human rights reflects a political choice to prioritize one set of Community goals over
another. The ironic result is that, notwithstanding that the Afolabi suit triggered a major revi-
sion of the ECOWAS Court’s protocol, litigants like Afolabi are still unable to challenge the
many barriers to intraregional trade in West Africa.
Our principal theoretical claim is that international institutions, like their domestic coun-
terparts, respond and adapt to changing norms and societal pressures. Even if rational func-
255 Sovereignty, Supra-nationality and Trade: The Case of ECOWAS Laws, 2 ECOWAS VANGUARD, Feb. 2013,
at 7, available at http://nants.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Soveriegnty-Supranationality-and-Trade-The-
Case-of-ECOWAS-Laws-ECO-VANGUARD-FEB-2013-English-Edition.pdf.
256 Nwogu, supra note 95, at 348–49; see alsoOPPONG, supra note 65, at 148 (asserting that the “links between
economic development and human rights are too obvious to merit discussing”).
257 Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate B, supra note 48.
258 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 73, para. 7.
259 Sovereignty, Supra-nationality and Trade, supra note 255, at 7.
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tionalist goals shape an international institution’s initial design, those objectives donot control
how the institution evolves over time. We have suggested that the ECOWAS Court’s trans-
formation is a result of the incremental layering on of new security roles for the Com-
munity together with civil society pressures to entrench respect for human rights. ECOWAS’s
contested involvement in humanitarian intervention brought human rights concerns into
Community politics. Eager to prevent civil wars and violent unrest in the region, ECOWAS
assumed a conflict prevention role and then expanded its activities to include promoting
constitutional transitions, good governance, and human rights. These developments created
a permissive environment for civil society groups and ECOWAS judges to lobby member
states to give the Court a human rights jurisdiction, in part by arguing that doing so would
also further economic integration. In practice, however, the choices made by government
leaders, Community officials, and NGOs implicitly maintained the barriers to judicial
enforcement of regional economic rules while facilitating a wave of human rights complaints
by private litigants that completed the Court’s redeployment.
V. CONCLUSION: HOWDEEP IS ECOWAS’S COMMITMENT TO PROTECTING
HUMANRIGHTS?
This article has examined the transformation of the ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice into a new international human rights court forWest Africa. Our study reveals that the
ECOWAS Court belongs on any list of human rights tribunals. Most such lists are limited to
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies linked to specific human rights treaties, such as the African
Charter system and the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Although the ECOWAS Court exercises jurisdiction over fewer states, it is at least as active in
adjudicating human rights violations as are these two continent-wide institutions. The Court
issues judgments quickly and provides legally binding remedies to victims who have direct
access to the Court without exhausting local remedies.Moreover, as scholars such as Solomon
Ebobrah have shown, ECOWAS judges have addressed many issues that have yet to come be-
fore the African Commission or Court and are making important contributions to regional
human rights jurisprudence.260
In this last part, we briefly consider three issues relating to whether a redeployed interna-
tional human rights court can survive in the rough and tumble world of African politics. The
first issue concerns the sincerity of states’ commitment to the ECOWAS Court’s human rights
jurisdiction. The second is whether the ECOWAS Court is likely to face a backlash similar to
those that the East African Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the Southern African Devel-
opment Community have experienced. Finally, we discuss whether the overlapping human
rights competences between the subregional courts and the African Charter system will con-
tribute to the fragmentation of international law in ways that undermine legal certainty and
respect for human rights.
260 E.g., Solomon T. Ebobrah,Human Rights Developments in African Sub-regional Economic Communities Dur-
ing 2009, 10 AFR. HUM. RTS. J. 233 (2010); Solomon T. Ebobrah, Human Rights Developments in African Sub-
regional Economic Communities During 2010, 11 AFR. HUM. RTS. J. 216 (2011); Ebobrah, Critical Issues, supra
note 112.
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Skeptics of the Court’s expansion into human rights have suggested that the 2005 Protocol
was an insincere commitment by ECOWAS member states.261 They have intimated that
West African leaders agreed to the Protocol not out of a desire to remedy human rights vio-
lations in the region but rather because they expected that the ECOWAS Court, whatever its
powers on paper, would have little influence on national laws or practices.262
We found no evidence to support this claim. The 2005 Protocol’s specific grant of “juris-
diction to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any member state” was
drafted, vetted, and approved in the samemanner as other ECOWAS legal instruments. If some
government officials predicted that the Protocol would be ignored, they were misinformed or
turned a blind eye to the plain language of the agreement.263 States also declined to extend pri-
vate litigant access to economic cases, a decision that suggests a careful choice aboutwhich types
of suits private litigants would be permitted to file. It is noteworthy that states later rejected
plausible proposals to curtail the Court’s human rights authority and adopted reforms that
strengthened the independence and quality of ECOWAS judges. Taken together, these actions
suggest that West African governments want the Court to review human rights complaints.
As noted in the introduction, the ECOWAS Court’s expansion into human rights is not
unique. In the 1970s, the European Court of Justice made a similar shift, albeit for different
reasons,264 as did (more recently) the courts associated with two other subregional economic
communities in Africa—the East African Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the Southern
African Development Community. Unlike the situation of the ECOWAS Court, however,
these expansions occurred via judicial lawmaking.265 In Europe, member states later ratified
the ECJ’s jurisprudential advances, most recently when they adopted the Lisbon Treaty that
made the EUCharter of Fundamental Rights legally binding.266 The consequences of the bold
judicial assertions of human rights competence by the EACJ and SADC Tribunal are still
unfolding, but early evidence indicates that both courts have faced substantial opposition from
governments.267
In response to an early controversial ruling involving appointments to the East African Leg-
islative Assembly, member states amended the East African Community Treaty to divide the
EastAfricanCourt of Justice into twodivisions (first instance and appellate), impose strict time
261 See, e.g., HEATHER SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERECOMMITMENTS:HUMANRIGHTSTREATIES, ABUSIVE
STATES, AND CITIZEN ACTIVISM 9 (2012).
262 A variant of this argument asserts that West African leaders adopted the 2005 Protocol to signal to interna-
tional organizations, foreign donors, or domestic interest groups a seemingly real but, in fact, temporary or disin-
genuous commitment to human rights or to other goals desired by those actors. For a critique of the claim that
human rights treaty ratifications are “costless signals,” see Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks,Measuring the Effects
of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 179 (2003).
263 See BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (2009) (explaining that states often “under-
estimate the probability that they will be pressured to live up to their international treaty commitments in the years
to come”).
264 See, e.g., Gra´inne de Bu´rca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor,
105 AJIL 649, 687 (2011).
265 Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International Courts,
14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 479, 492–93 (2013); see also Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or
Nurture? Judicial Law-Making in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT’L ORG.
563 (2010).
266 De Bu´rca, supra note 264, at 670–73.
267 See sources cited supra notes 9 and 260.
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limits on filing complaints, and add new grounds for removing and suspending judges.268
The Court later interpreted the Treaty as conferring a limited mandate to adjudicate human
rights issues. Government officials have since repeatedly challenged the Court’s jurisdiction
over human rights suits.269 In Southern Africa, the reaction has been more severe. Beginning
in 2008, the SADC Tribunal upheld suits by white farmers challenging land seizures in
Zimbabwe as violating the human rights and rule-of-law provisions in the SADC Treaty.270
President Robert Mugabe responded to these decisions by mobilizing the SADC’s highest
political body to suspend the Tribunal pending the drafting of a new protocol that strips its
jurisdiction over complaints from private litigants. These measures have ended, at least for the
foreseeable future, the SADC Tribunal’s ability to adjudicate human rights claims.271
The ECOWAS Court’s experience is different in several respects. First, unlike their col-
leagues in eastern and southern Africa, ECOWAS judges do not need to finesse whether they
have a human rights competence, because member states have expressly given the Court juris-
diction to review and remedy human rights violations. Second, West African governments
conferred this jurisdiction on the Court for reasons internal to the Community—namely,
ECOWAS’s growing role in regional security and a desire to facilitate constitutional transitions
and goodgovernance.Third, the supranational status of ECOWAS is further advanced than the
other two subregional integration projects. In 2006, ECOWASmember states made Commu-
nity protocols directly applicable in national legal orders without the need for ratification and
enhanced the supranational authority of ECOWAS institutions. By contrast, the SADC and,
to a lesser extent, EAC remain predominantly interstate bodies whose secretariats are largely
reactive to shifts in governments’ commitments to community and integration. Fourth, the
ECOWASCourt’s human rightsmandate enjoys the strong support of the ECOWASCommis-
sion,whose officials can help assess the political landscape and redirect opposition to theCourt
in ways that address member states’ concerns without compromising the judges’ indepen-
dence.Taken together, thesedifferences explainwhy theECOWASCourt’s human rightsman-
date stands on politically and legally firmer footing than that of its subregional neighbors, and
why the Court has survived unpopular judgments and a campaign to curtail its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the challenge of eliciting compliance with the ECOWAS Court’s judgments
remains formidable.272 But this problem must be put in perspective. The European Court of
HumanRights and the Inter-AmericanCourt ofHumanRights took decades to establish their
authority, whereas subregional tribunals in Africa are still in their infancy. ECOWAS judges
have demonstrated political savvy as they navigate this fraught terrain. The judges have been
circumspect in interpreting international law and inmodulating the remedies that they award
to successful applicants. Such strategies help to establish a politically safe space for the
268 Henry Onoria, Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial Independence in the East African
Community, 54 J. AFR. L. 74, 83 (2010).
269 Gathii, supra note 161,manuscript at 24–27 (describing the backlash by governments following theNyong’o
election case). The precise relationship between the timing of the treaty amendments and their influence on the
EACJ’s human rights case law remains to be explored.
270 Treaty of the South African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 116 (1993), at http://
www.sadc.int/documents-publications/sadc-treaty/.
271 E.g., Frederick Cowell, The Death of the Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s Human Rights
Jurisdiction, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153 (2013); Erika de Wet, The Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern
African Development Community: Implications for Dispute Settlement in Southern Africa, 28 ICSID REV. 45 (2013).
272 See supra notes 218–26 and accompanying text.
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Court—a space in which it can condemn clear violations of human rights and pressure gov-
ernments outside the courtroom to comply with its rulings.
Many government officials, human rights groups and lawyers anticipate that the member
states will eventually specify which human rights treaties can be adjudicated by the ECOWAS
Court, add an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, and create an appellate review
mechanism.These revisions, if they do occur, should not be seen as rebukes of either theCourt
or its judges. Rather, such revisions are more likely to reflect a maturing legal system that is
evolving in conjunction with fundamental reorientations of ECOWAS objectives.
A final issue concerns whether themultiplicity of human rights adjudicatory bodies is prob-
lematic insofar as it exacerbates the fragmentation of international law in Africa. Scholars who
express concerns about fragmentation cite the lack of clarity from inconsistent legal rulings and
the fear that governmentsmay use that inconsistency to follow themost lenient interpretations
of their human rights obligations.273 The ECOWASCourt contributed to these fragmentation
concerns in one high-profile case—a judgment against Senegal that it violated the rights of
formerChadianPresidentHisseinHabre´ by taking steps to prosecute him for torture andother
international crimes.274 The Court disallowed the prosecution, and in a later ICJ proceeding,
Senegal argued that it had delayed prosecuting Habre´ due to its obligation to comply with the
ECOWAS Court judgment.275
Although other examples may arise, the adjudication of human rights by the ECOWAS
Court enhances, on balance, the clarity of international law and raises, not lowers, human
rights protections inWest Africa. For civil society groups, the ECOWASCourt and other sub-
regional tribunals offer a way to minimize the “obstruction, haggling, [and] delay” that many
observers associate with the continental human rights system.276 For lawyers, subregional lit-
igation provides a corrective to the limited avenues of legal recourse available to victims of
rights abuses in Africa.277 For judges on subregional courts, the adjudication of human rights
provides an opportunity to expand their dockets, develop legal doctrine, and issue rulings that
are relevant to stakeholders. If the courts’ decisions also complement or extend the norms of
the African Charter, so much the better.278
This conclusion has provided only a cursory overview of the many issues implicated by
the burgeoning of international human rights litigation inAfrica.The contemporaneousmove
273 E.g., VILJOEN, supra note 134, at 437 (warning that the existence of multiple international venues for adju-
dicating human rights claims “may lead to divergence in jurisprudence and to forum shopping,where quasi-judicial
and judicial institutions are compared and played off against one another”).
274 Habre´ v. Senegal, Judgment, supra note 200, paras. 58, 61.
275 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2012 ICJ REP. 1, para. 110
( July 20). The ICJ rejected Senegal’s argument, holding that “Senegal’s duty to comply with its obligations under
the [UN] Convention [Against Torture] cannot be affected by the decision of the ECOWAS Court of Justice.” Id.,
para. 111. In fact, the ECOWAS Court had left open the option of trying Habre´ before an ad hoc or international
tribunal.Habre´ v. Senegal, Judgment, supranote 200, paras. 58, 61. In 2012, Senegal and theAfricanUnion agreed
to create a hybrid court within the Senegalese judicial system, known as the Extraordinary African Chambers,
with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture committed inChad in the 1980s.
Sangeeta Shah,Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), 13 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 351, 363–66 (2013).
276 KOFIOTENGKUFUOR, THEAFRICANHUMANRIGHTS SYSTEM:ORIGIN ANDEVOLUTION 104 (2010);
see also Solomon Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Prospects and Challenges,
17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP L. 78, 87 (2009).
277 Duffy, supra note 212, at 182–87.
278 See KUFUOR, supra note 275, at 105; VILJOEN, supra note 134, at 453–55.
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into human rights by three similarly situated subregional community courts, together with the
increasing activity of the African Charter institutions, creates a natural experiment to examine
the different ways that government officials, judges, and civil society groupsmobilize and nav-
igate the often fraught politics of human rights compliance. Our initial review of this exper-
iment suggests that themanner in which international courts acquire jurisdiction over human
rights is legally and politically consequential. Themode of acquisition affects issues such as the
strategies of litigants, the interpretive methodologies of judges, the remedies awarded, and
the responses of governments to the courts’ exercise of their newly acquired authority.279 The
explicit delegation of human rights authority also provides international judges with a political
buffer as they take on the challenging task of adjudicating state violations of human rights.
279 See Joost Pauwelyn &Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across
International Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONALRELATIONS: THE STATEOF THEART 445 ( Jeffrey L. Dunoff&Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (suggesting
a connection between the institutional structure of international courts and the types of treaty interpretation
adopted by their judges).
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